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"Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The
Legal Foundations of Foreign
Intervention
David M. Kresock*
Introduction
As Eastern European nations shed the burdens of a forced communist
culture, seeking to create their own social and political milieu, the interna-
tional community' must re-evaluate its approach to the sovereignty2 of
individual states. To ensure that the international community can meet
the sometimes conflicting goals of assuring fundamental human rights
and political sovereignty, the international policies of both humanitarian
intervention and national self-determination must be harmonized. With-
out a coherent policy that permits states to actively protect human rights,
the international community leaves ethnic minorities, and others, exposed
to threats of abuse and mistreatment so long as the abusive nation does
not move the conflict into the international arena. The current situation
in the Balkans serves as an example of the international community's inad-
equate ability to protect human rights and preserve state sovereignty
under current international law.
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Cornell Law School; BA., 1991, State University of New
York, University Center at Albany.
1. As used in this Note, the term "international community" refers to that collec-
tive body of states (i.e., the United States of America, Russia, etc.) and organizations of
states (i.e., United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of Ameri-
can States, etc.) that recognize principles of law that govern international relations.
2. While the term "sovereignty" does not easily lend itself to a single denotation, I
here refer to the contemporary principle of sovereignty defined as "the basic interna-
tional legal status of a State that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the
governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign State or to for-
eign law other than public international law." 10 ENYcLoPEDIA OF PUBUC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 408 (1987). Contemporary international law views state "sovereignty" as a
means to protect the right of self-determination. I&. at 410. In addition, this theory of
"sovereignty" necessarily presupposes that all states are subject to "sovereign equality"
and "hold principally all rights and obligations possible under general international
law, notwithstanding differences of a political, military, cultural, socio-economic or
other nature." Id. at 411. The principle of non-intervention serves as the primary
means by which the international community protects state sovereignty and sovereign
equality. Id.
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In its most ideal form, "international law"3 would allow third-party
states, or organizations of states, to intervene in conflicts traditionally con-
sidered within a state's "domestic"jurisdiction when that state refuses, or is
unable, to institute measures to preserve fundamental human rights. To
accomplish this, the traditional framework of international law must
evolve to accommodate our present understandings and conceptions of
both "international" and "domestic" concerns. Several factors that plague
the current structure of public international law will mitigate against fears
that this limited "right" of intervention will be subject to abuse.
Part I of this Note describes how the traditional policies of interna-
tional law and the United Nations (U.N.) relate to the doctrines of self-
determination, non-intervention, and humanitarian intervention. Part II
relates the background of the current conflict in the Balkans by describing
how ancient ethnic animosities, inflamed by modern political movements,
have exploded into the current civil war and the practice of "ethnic cleans-
ing."4 Part III suggests that the established legal structure has failed to
provide an adequate solution to the massive human rights violations
resulting from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Part IV attempts
to identify possible alternatives to the present legal structure that would
preserve the fundamental right of state sovereignty, but also guarantee the
basic human rights that the international community must seek to protect.
I. Traditional Policies of International Law and the United Nations
A. The Right of Self-Determination
1. Origin of the Doctrine
The concept of "self-determination" evades an easy definition.5 Because
of its firm basis in liberal political philosophy, many view the principle of
self-determination as "the pre-emptory norm of international law."6 At the
core of self-determination lies the notion that outside parties should not
interfere in individuals' attempts to shape their political regime.7
3. "International Law" refers to "[t] hose laws governing the legal relations between
nations," as well as "rules and principles... dealing with the conduct of nations and of
international organizations." BLACK's LAw DinoNARw 816 (6th ed. 1990). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrE= STATES §§ 101,
102 cmt. b (1987). Nations generally consider international customs, treaties, and
derivatives of general principles common to major legal systems of the world as the
most important sources of international law. See generaly id. at §§ 101-03.
4. "Ethnic cleansing" refers to the systematic removal of the members of one eth-
nic group by the members of another in an attempt to "purify" geographical regions.
Russell Watson et al., Ethnic Cleansing, NEwswEFK, Aug. 17, 1992, at 16;J.F.O. McAllister,
Atrocity and Outrage, TIME, Aug. 17, 1992, at 23. See infra part II.C.
5. See, e.g., Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A CriticalAnalysis of Cur-
rent International Law Theories, 18 StRAcusEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 21, 21-22 (1992) ("Current
international law theory regarding self-determination is in a state of uncertainty and
confusion. It is inconsistent within itself, and it does not accord with state practice.").
6. MCHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAw Am PR.&nc 1 (1982)
(emphasis in original).
7. Jost Delbrfick, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 INm. UJ. 887, 889 (1992).
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Some scholars trace the theoretical genesis of self-determination to
the American and French Revolutions. 8 The concept first emerged as an
explicit principle of international law soon after World War I when the
League of Nations attempted to address the needs of the Central Powers'
former colonies.9 To free themselves of the financial burdens associated
with imperialism, the Allies formally established the doctrine of self-deter-
mination as a means to lead the former colonies to self-rule. 10
The right of self-determination held much greater significance after
World War II. Seeking to promote international stability, the founders of
the United Nations listed the "self-determination of peoples" as one of the
organization's primary goals. 11 Further, the United Nations relied upon
the doctrine of self-determination to justify decolonization and the crea-
tion of the International Trusteeship System.12 Finally, the U.N. General
Assemblyl3 has lent significant credibility to the doctrine by formally
8. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT'L L. 177, 179-180 (1991). See also D. RoNEN, THE QUEST FOR SErL-DERrZrTION
1 (1979); HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION Mov. mNTs 55-56 (1988). Brilmayer notes the evolution of "popular sover-
eignty" as the prime factor motivating the development of self-determination as a polit-
ical theory. Brilmayer, supra, at 180.
9. Cass, supra note 5, at 24-25; Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 180; Robert E. Frankel,
Comment, Recognizing Self-Determination in International Law: Kuwait's Conflict with Iraq,
14 Lov. LA INT'L & COMP. L.J. 359, 361 (1992).
10. Cass, supra note 5, at 25. To effectuate this transformation, the League of
Nations devised the mandate system and appointed a League member to serve as a
"guardian" of each colony until the colony demonstrated its ability to manage its own
affairs. See QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 231 (1930). In
1947, the United Nations took control of colonies still under mandate. U.N. CHARTR
art. 77, 11 (a) ("The [international] trusteeship system shall apply to ... territories now
held under mandate. .. ."). See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, the Allies refused to apply the principle of self-determination to their
own colonies. Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 180. See also ALRED COBBAN, THE NATION
STATE AND NATIONAL SELF DETERMINATION 66-69 (1969).
11. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides, "The Purposes of the United
Nations are: ... To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1
2. Further, article 55 declares the U.N.'s commitment to international economic and
social cooperation by seeking to create "conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Id. art. 55.
12. Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 181; Frankel, supra note 9, at 363-64. To facilitate
decolonization, the U.N. Charter establised the International Trusteeship System as a
means "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancements of
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned." U.N. CArTR art. 76, 1 b. Under the International Trusteeship System, the
boundaries of the former colonies became the boundaries of the new states, and the
new states were then free to exercise the right of self-determination. Frankel, supra
note 9, at 363.
13. The General Assembly is the policy making body of the United Nations, com-
posed of one to five delegates from each member nation; however, each member
nation has only one vote. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22 (discussing powers,
duties, and structure of the General Assembly).
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endorsing it in several legal instruments.14
International case law has shown great deference to the principle of
self-determination, and the International Court of Justice15 has recog-
nized that states exercise the right of self-determination only through the
actual process of integration, free association, or independence. 16 One
judge succinctly captured the principle of self-determination when he
stated, "It is for people to determine the destiny of the territory and not
the territory the destiny of the people."17 The Court, however, has also
recognized that the provision of humanitarian aid, even without the per-
mission of the government receiving it, does not constitute unlawful inter-
vention and does not violate the principle of self-determination.' 8
At present, controversy rages as to the proper scope and role of the
self-determination doctrine in contemporary public international law.19
Most discord surrounds attempts to define both the "self' which may
"determine," and the conditions under which the right to self-determina-
tion may be exercised. Once these critical questions are addressed, the
challenge of assigning the right of self-determination a role in the modem
structure of international law remains.
2. Present Ambiguity
Any attempt to determine the nature of the right of self-determination
14. See, eg., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, GA. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); The Situation with Regard to Implementation of
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA. Res. 1654,
U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/L366 (1961); Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); The Right of Peoples and Nations to
Self-Determination, GA. Res. 637, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
15. Chapter XIV of the U.N. Charter established the International Court ofJustice
(I.C.J.) as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTM art. 92.
By virtue of their membership in the United Nations, all members agree to comply with
any I.CJ. decision in a case to which they are a party. Id. art. 94,1 1. Furthermore, if a
party fails to abide by an I.C.J. decision, the adverse party may request that the Security
Council take measures to effectuate the judgment. Id. art. 94, 1 2.
16. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 24-25 (Oct. 16).
17. Id. (separate opinion ofJ. Dillard).
18. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). The court specifically stated: "There can be no doubt that the
provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever
their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or
as in any other way contrary to international law." Id. at 114, 1 242.
19. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 5, at 21-22; Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 179; Frankel,
supra note 9, at 360; Avishal Margalti &Joseph Raz, National SelfDetermination, 87J. PHIL
443 (1990); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law,
25 CoRNEL INT'L LJ. 481 (1992).
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must begin with a definition of the "self"20 which hopes to exercise that
right under public international law. Commentators generally accept that
the right of self-determination lies with individual nations or "peoples"
and not individual persons.2 1 However, despite its unambiguous adoption
of the principle, and its application of the doctrine to "peoples," the
United Nations has not defined when a "people" exists. 22 Indeed, several
commentators contend that the concept of "peoples" resists a single defi-
20. Widespread controversy exists regarding the appropriateness of the application
of the concept of the "self' to a particular group of individuals. A full explication and
analysis of all relevant theories falls beyond the scope of this Note. However, a brief
discussion of the relevant theories, based on the liberal assumption that individuals
constitute a government for their own benefit and not vice versa, may prove helpful to
the reader. See generally, Robert W. McGee, A Third Liberal Theory of Secession, 14 LIVER-
POOL L. REv. 45, 46-54 (1992).
Harry Beran espoused the "first" liberal theory of secession, stating that regions
should permit secession, and thereby grant the right to self-determination, in all but
the following six instances:
(1) The group which wishes to secede is not sufficiently large to assume the
basic responsibilities of an independent state. (2) [The group] is not prepared
to permit sub-groups within itself to secede although such secession is morally
and practically possible .... (3) [The group] wishes to exploit or oppress a sub-
group within itself which cannot secede in turn because of territorial dispersal
or other reasons .... (4) [The group] occupies an area not on the borders of
the existing state so that secession would create an enclave .... (5) [The group]
occupies an area which is culturally, economically or militarily essential to the
existing state .... (6) [The group] occupies an area which has a disproportion-
ately high share of the economic resources of the existing state.
Harry Beran, A Liberal Theory of Secesion, 32 PoL SUD. 21, 30-31 (1984).
Anthony Birch enunciated a "second," more limited, liberal theory of secession by
stating that regions should permit secession only in the following four instances:
(1) The region was included in the state by force and its people have displayed
a continuing refusal to give full consent to the union .... (2) The national
government has failed in a serious way to protect the basic rights and security of
the citizens of the region .... (3) The democratic system has failed to safe-
guard the legitimate political and economic interests of the region, either
because the representative process is biased against the region or because the
executive authorities contrive to ignore the results of that process .... (4) The
national government has ignored or rejected an explicit or implicit bargain
between sections that was entered into as a way of preserving the essential inter-
ests of a section that might find itself outvoted by a national majority ....
Anthony H. Birch, Another Liberal Theory of Secession, 32 PoL STUD. 596, 599-600 (1984).
Robert McGee offers a "third" liberal theory of secession when he contends:
"[S]ecession is a right, not something one has to get permission for, and is alwaysjusti-
fled. There is no theoretical reason why the seceding group cannot be as small as a
single individual, although there may be some technical difficulties involved when the
entity seceding is this small." McGee, supra, at 45.
Although these arguments present an interesting philosophical debate, international
law focuses the debate over the "self' upon group status as a "people." See infra note 21
and accompanying text.
For a comprehensive discussion of the extent to which minority status impacts a
movement for secession, see Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the
Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NoTm DAM L Rxv. 615 (1991).
21. Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 179; Cass, supra note 5, at 29 n.38; Frankel, supra note
9, at 368-369. This view is supported by the fact that the relevant international docu-
ments make reference to the self-determination rights of "peoples." See supra note 14.
22. Frankel, supra note 9, at 368.
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nition because the concept has been inconsistently applied.23 While the
United Nations has recognized the right of self-determination for all "peo-
ples," we have little indication of when a group of individuals rises to the
level of a "people."2
4
Perhaps the most illuminating method of divining the contours of
what constitutes a "people" emerges from the context of decolonialization.
Critics generally accept the notion that native colonial inhabitants consti-
tute a "people" and possess the right of self-determination within colonial
boundaries.2 5 To protect the interests of international harmony, interna-
tional law limits the right of self-determination to colonial boundaries.
26
Thus, only those native inhabitants of former colonies clearly possess the
right of self-determination. 2 7 However, beyond the colonial context,
international law offers no specific guidance as to the circumstances under
which a group constitutes a "people" and the right of self-determination
applies.28
Once the "self" has been defined under international law, a number
of factors limit the ability of the "people" to exercise the right of self-deter-
mination. For example, a "people" may not exercise the right of self-
determination more than once.2 9 Further, a "people" may not exercise
the right of self-determination unless it has been subject to foreign or
23. See, e.g., Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsider-
ing the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 597 (1987);
Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Idea 19 ISR. L. Rnv.
310, 312 (1984); Kingsbury, supra note 19, at 500.
24. To further complicate matters, many commentators support the proposition
that self-determination only applies to "peoples," not "minorities." See, e.g.,JAMiEs CRAw.
FORD, TiiE CREATION OF STATES AT INrERNAIOiNAL LAw 91-93 (1979); WILSON, supra note
8, at 88; PoMERANCE, supra note 6, at 2-3. Exactly when a "minority" becomes a "people"
is unclear. See Addis, supra note 20, at 660 (arguing that ethnic minorities constitute
"peoples").
25. Cass, supra note 5, at 29.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 29-30.
28. A number of commentators have established lists of criteria for determining
when a group constitutes a "people." Among those criteria are: (1) a common history,
(2) racial or ethnic ties, (3) cultural or linguistic ties, (4) religious or ideological ties,
(5) a common territory or geographical location, (6) a common economic base, and
(7) a sufficient number of people. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, East
Pakistan Study, 8 INT'L COMMISSION Juiusrs REv. 23, 47 (1972). In addition, Lea
Brilmayer contends that the primary factor in validating a claim for self-determination
or secession should lie in the group's territorial claim. Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 177.
For an intensive evaluation of the criteria necessary to constitute a "people" for pur-
poses of self-determination, see Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination UnderInternational Law:
Validity of Claims to Secede; 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257, 275-78 (1981).
29. Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM.J. INT'L L. 459, 464 (1971). Emerson
notes the position of the United Nations by quoting former United Nations Secretary
General U Thant
So far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is
concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I
do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Mem-
ber State.
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alien domination.8 0 Further, a "people" must also recognize itself as a
"people"3 ' and desire to separate from the dominating state.3 2
B. The Doctrine of Non-Intervention
The general body of international law and the United Nations have histor-
ically supported the doctrine of non-intervention.33 Complementary to
the right of self-determination, the tenets of sovereignty and equality
among states lie at the foundation of the principle of non-intervention.
3 4
Acting partially out of self-interest, nations adopted the principle of non-
intervention in their international political relations as a means to guaran-
tee respect for international equality.
3 5
The founders of the United Nations incorporated the doctrine of
non-intervention in the United Nations Charter. Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter states, "[n ] othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter."36 The Charter
qualifies this general support for the doctrine of non-intervention with a
subsequent exception-"this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."37 The consequences of this
apparently limited exception to the general rule of non-intervention do
not immediately present themselves. In order for the U.N. to adopt
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council3 8 must find that the controversy (1) does not lie "essentially
i.
30. PoMERANcE, supra note 6, at 14 (detailing problems with the "foreign domina-
tion" requirement).
31. Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1975 DEr. C.L.
REv. 71, 83.
32. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International
Law, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 51, 70 (1988).
33. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and
Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law-Part I,
20 DEwv. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 305, 307 (1992); Cass, supra note 5, at 26; Delbriick, supra
note 7, at 889; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War,
67 I -D. LJ. 903, 908 n.38 (1992); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27); Barcelona Traction (Belgium v.
Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 4, 32 (Feb. 5); LEE C. BucH=rr, SEcEssioN 43-127 (1978); Louise
Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of Government 56
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 251 (1985).
34. Delbrfick, supra note 7, at 889.
35. Id.
36. U.N. CRTmER art. 2, 17.
37. Id. Chapter VII of the Charter serves as the mechanism authorizing the Security
Council to adopt measures which permit the use of force to bring nations into compli-
ance with United Nations resolutions. See generally id arts. 39-51 (discussing the scope
of Security Council authority to authorize the use of force).
38. The Security Council is the executive body of the United Nations that may use
diplomatic, economic, or military means to resolve international disputes. See generally
U.N. CHRvTR arts. 23-32 (discussing the composition, functions, and powers of the
Security Council). The Security Council is an eleven member body with five permanent
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within the domesticjurisdiction" of the state,39 and (2) constitutes a threat
to "international peace and security."40 On its face, the Charter appears
to forbid U.N. action that would interfere in a state's domestic affairs
when the situation does not possess an "international" element. In addi-
tion to the prohibition in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4)
states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."4'
Two exceptions traditionally apply to the doctrine of non-interven-
tion. Contemporary public international law recognizes the right of
outside states to intervene in the affairs of a state when: (1) such interven-
tion is in the actor's self-defense or pursuant to a request for assistance in
the self-defense of another state, and (2) such intervention is aimed at the
maintenance of international peace and security.42 Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations .... ."4 The authority for an
individual state to use force for the maintenance of international peace
and security arises as a result of a determination by the Security Council
that such force is necessary and a request upon said country to use that
force. Article 42 of the Charter states: "[T]he Security Council... may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security."44 Article 48(1) grants U.N.
Member states the right to implement measures, including the use of
members-the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and China-
and six additional members that are elected at two year intervals. Id. art. 23.
39. Id. art. 2, 7.
40. Id. art. 39.
41. Id art. 2, 4.
42. FEzNAI o R. TESON, HumAirAmAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY iNTO LAW AND
MoRAm 128 (1988);Jean-Pierre L Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANurARLAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UmrlrD NAkroNs 199-200 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
43. U.N. CHARTER art 51. In full, article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exer-
cise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
1d.
44. U.N. CHAR= art. 42. The United Nations Charter vests the Security Council
with the sole authority to determine: (1) the existence of any threat to international
order, and (2) the appropriate measures to remedy that threat. Id. art. 39. Article 39
states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id. Article 41 provides the mechanism for
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force, that the Security Council deems appropriate to maintain interna-
tional order.4 5 Absent a claim of self-defense or a request of the Security
Council, a state may not intervene in the affairs of another state.4 6
C. Humanitarian Intervention 47
1. Pre- v. Post-Charter Era
Constructing a precise definition of "humanitarian intervention" proves
difficult. 48 Many commentators writing in the late nineteenth century and
into the twentieth century believed intervention on humanitarian grounds
justifiable when a state denied a specific minimum of rights to those within
its territory, but only "in extreme cases... where great evils existed, great
crimes were being perpetrated, or where there was danger of race extermina-
tion."49 One commentator even claimed that "[t]yrannical conduct of a
the Security Council to impose non-military sanctions to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, pos-
tal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of conmunication, and the severance
of diplomatic relations.
Id. art. 41. Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to use force to remedy threats to
international order. In full, article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
Id. art. 42. Articles 41 and 42, interpreted together, require the Security Council to first
consider "peaceful" means to protect or restore international peace and security before
authorizing the use of force.
45. Article 48(1) provides: "The action required to carry out the decisions of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken
by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council
may determine." Id art. 48, 1 1.
46. The United Nations' Declaration of Non-Intervention supports this interpreta-
tion and states, "No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any rea-
son whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." Declaration on the
Inadmibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Inde-
pendence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 14 (1965) [hereinafter Declaration of Non-Intervention].
47. Humanitarian aid may have a wide variety of applications, such as the provision
of medical supplies, but always presupposes the permission of the target state.
Alternatively, humanitarian intervention does not require permission.
48. Nanda, supra note 33, at 311.
49. Amos S. HERSHEY, EssENTIALs OF INTERNATIoNAL PuBuc LAW AND ORGANIZATION
239 (rev. ed. 1927) (emphasis added). See also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERwATioNAL L W AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (1963); WuIAm E. HALi, T1 t~rE ON INTERNAIoNAL
LAW 337-350 (Pearce Higgens ed., 8th ed. 1924); HENmr G. HODGES, THE DocrnasE OF
INTERVENTION 1 (1915); ELLawR C. STOWELL, INTERNATIoNAL LAw: A RESTATEFENT OF
PRNcwLs IN CoNFORmr wrrH ACrUAL PRAcncE 349 (1931); ELLRmy C. STOWELL,
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 53 (1921) [hereinafter INTERVENTION]; ANN VAN
WYMEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTRmvENnON 21 (1956).
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government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or
religious persecution" constituted appropriate grounds for humanitarian
intervention.50 Despite the early consensus as to the doctrine's existence,
it fell into disrepute for two reasons: (1) lack of a consensus upon the
definition of "humanitarian" or "intervention,"5 1 and (2) the potential for
powerful states to abuse the doctrine.52 The advent of the United Nations
brought a new approach to humanitarian issues.
From the outset, the United Nations marked a clearer course for the
status of "humanitarian intervention." Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
forbids all U.N. members from using force "against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state."5 3 In addition, Article 2(7)
exempts from scrutiny under international law all "matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."54 Taken at face
value, these provisions seem to establish an obligation on all U.N. mem-
50. HALL, supra note 49, at 302.
51. Christine Ellerman, Command of Sovereignty Gives Way to Concern for Humanity, 26
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L 341, 344 (1993). No clear consensus existed as to what actions
merited humanitarian intervention. One author defined humanitarian intervention as:
"the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed
the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason
andjustice." INTERVEIMON, supra note 49, at 53. Another commentator characterized
the "classical" definition of humanitarian intervention as:
[T] hose instances in which a nation unilaterally uses military force to intervene
in the territory of another state for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of
indigenous people from life-threatening or otherwise unconscionable infrac-
tions of their human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it
acquiesces.
David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. Tor L.
REv. 253, 264 (1992).
52. Fonteyne, supra note 42, at 218-20; BRowNm, supra note 49, at 338-42. One
commentator contends, "[H ]umanitarian intervention, on the basis of all available defi-
nitions, would be an instrument wide open to abuse." Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-
Hearted Gunmen, in HumANrrARAN INMRVENTION AND THE UNrrEo NAxrONS 146 (Rich-
ard B. Lillich ed., 1973). In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the definition of
humanitarian intervention, general principles of international law require "necessity"
and "proportionality." Nanda, supra note 33, at 311; Delbrfick, supra note 7, at 901.
Widespread disagreement also exists when defining the extent of "necessity" and "pro-
portionality," and this ambiguity leads to the major criticism of a broad definition of
humanitarian intervention. Because only powerful states find themselves in a position
to excercise the "right" to intervene on humanitarian grounds, the lack of international
guidelines and limitations provides little protection against its abuse. Nanda, supra note
33, at 309.
53. U.N. C A'Rnr art. 2, 1 4. Article 2 of the Charter lists the "principles" that
guide all U.N. Members' international relations. Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
54. Id. art. 2, 7. Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter;, but this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
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bers, and the organization itself, to refrain from acting to correct humani-
tarian concerns that do not escape the confines of a member state.55 The
U.N.'s Declaration of Non-Intervention supports this interpretation. 56
2. Modern Debate
Despite the apparent clarity of international obligations arising under Arti-
cles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, states have asserted the right to
intervene in the affairs of another state when attempting to protect its own
nationals within the jurisdiction of a foreign state, 57 to protect the nation-
als of a third state,58 or even to protect the nationals of the state against
which it directs the corrective steps.59 Indeed, a narrow view of humanita-
rian intervention-breaching a state's territorial integrity for the limited
purpose of rescuing one's nationals-seems widely accepted.60 Definitive
authority does not exist, however, for the proposition that a state or inter-
national body may intervene to terminate human rights violations.61
Id. Because Chapter VII permits the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures
only in situations that threaten international peace and security, see supra note 44, it
appears that "domestic" matters are immune from international redress.
55. See, e-g., Delbrfick, supra note 7, at 892; Ellerman, supra note 51, at 346-47. Such
an interpretation, so it is argued, emerges from the "plain language" of the Charter.
Nanda, supra note 33, at 310.
56. Declaration of Non-Intervention, supra note 46. The declaration specifically pro-
vides, "No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal and external affairs of any other State." Id.
57. See generally, Ved P. Nanda, The United States' Armed Intervention in Grenada -
Impact on World Order, 14 CAt. W. INT'L LJ. 395 (1984) (discussing the 1983 U.S. inter-
vention in Grenada).
58. See generally, Ved P. Nanda, The United States'Action in the 1965 Dominican Criss:
Impact on World Order, 43 DEuv. L.J. 439, 472-79 (1966) (discussing the 1965 U.S. inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic).
59. See generally NATAuNO RoNZrrrI, REsCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MIm-
TARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HuANrr 102 (1985) (discussing
Tanzania's 1978 intervention in Uganda).
60. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1941 (1976) statement by the U.S. representative dur-
ing the U.N. Security Council debate on the Entebbe rescue mission by Israel:
ET]here is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of
one's own nationals from the imminent threat of injury or death in a situation
where the State in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable
to protect them. The right... is limited to such use of force as is necessary and
appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury.
See also RFSTATEMENT (THnU) OF THE FOREIGN RE.ATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 703 cmt. e (1987): "It is increasingly accepted that a state may take steps to rescue
victims or potential victims in an action strictly limited to that purpose and not likely to
involve disproportionate destruction of life or property in the state where the rescue
takes place." Id.
61. See RESTATEMENT (THImD) OF T=E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAv OF =H UNITED
STATES § 703 cmt. e (1987):
Whether a state may intervene with military force in the territory of another
state without its consent, not to rescue the victims but to prevent or terminate
human rights violations, is not agreed or authoritatively determined. Such
intervention might be acceptable if taken pursuant to resolution of a United
Nations body or of a regional organization such as the Organization of Ameri-
can States.
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In seeking to establish an international right of humanitarian inter-
vention, commentators have adopted approaches that seek to reinterpret
the present legal structures to fit the demands of an evolving international
community. At the forefront of this movement is an attempt to redefine
"sovereignty" and "territorial integrity," to fully clarify the scope of Article
2(4)'s prohibition against intervention.62 Some commentators contend
that an act of humanitarian intervention does not violate a state's "sover-
eignty" or "territorial integrity" because it is not aimed at "territorial con-
quest."68 These commentators suggest that the doctrines of "sovereignty"
and "territorial integrity" should not merely provide the internationally
recognized regime with absolute control over all matters within its bor-
ders. Rather, they contend that the modern doctrine of "sovereignty"
seeks to protect "popular sovereignty":
International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but,
in its modern sense, the object of protection is not the power base of the
tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the apparatus of a
totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a population
freely to express and effect choices about the indentities and policies of its
governors.6 4
Id.
62. U.N. CHARTrx art. 2, 1 4; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
63. Ellerman, supra note 51, at 354. See also W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984). Reisman
contends that Article 2(4) should be interpreted broadly, and a narrow construction
"has been unable to provide would-be strict appliers with a legal characterization consis-
tent with the relevant international policies .... " Id. at 644.
64. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L 866, 872 (1990). Reisman further contends:
Happily, the international legal system in which declamations such as "retat,
c'est moi" were coherent has long since been consigned to history's scrap heap.
In our era, such pronouncements become, at least for audiences at a safe
remove, the stuff of refined comedy. They would be occasions for general hilar-
ity, even in the countries where they are still staged, were it not for the endless
misery that the dictators who grant themselves sovereignty always inflict upon
the human beings trapped within the boundaries of the territory the dictators
have confused with themselves.
Id. at 870.
More troublesome is an acceptable construction of "territorial integrity" under Arti-
cle 2(4). However, we reach an acceptable result by examining "territorial integrity," in
this context, as an element of the "sovereignty" doctrine. In the late Middle Ages, rul-
ers utilized the term "sovereignty" to resist claims of loyalty made by the pope or
emperor, and to "establish a relationship of immediate obedience between ruler and
individual subjects." 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA oF Punuc INTERNATIONAL LAw 399 (1987).
Today, international law recognizes that "[s]overeignty is a legal status within but not
above public international law." Id. at 408. Further, the "scope of 'domestic affairs,' in
general, is determined by international law," and "[h]uman rights are no longer consid-
ered an exclusively domestic affair." Id. at 411. Therefore, as a component of the con-
cept of sovereignty, the meaning of "territorial integrity" must likewise be subject to
definition by international law. If one reinterprets the "sovereign" as the people's rep-
resentative, then undertaking an act which is for the benefit of the people, and one that
does not unseat their representative structure, should neither harm the state's territo-
rial integrity nor offend its sovereignty.
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Thus, so long as a state intervenes solely to provide humanitarian assist-
ance to the populace of the target state, neither the target state's sover-
eignty nor its territorial integrity have been violated.65
Other commentators have proposed remedying the debate over
humanitarian intervention by reformulating the definition of "domestic
jurisdiction" under Article 2(7).66 The U.N. Charter imposes upon all its
members the obligation to "fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the [United Nations] Charter."67 One such obli-
gation is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights .... "68
Commentators contend that these obligations impose duties to observe
minimum levels of basic human rights, which, due to membership in the
United Nations, are not "domestic" but "international."69 Thus, when
human rights violations occur, the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security
Council to attempt to remedy the situation.70
H. Current Situation in the Balkans
A. Historical Ethnic Animosities & Modem Yugoslavia
In a region where no one culture holds a majority,71 where cross cultural
marriages abound, and where only an individual's last name serves to
identify him or her as a member of a particular minority,72 many find it
65. Ellerman, supra note 51, at 354-55; TEs6N, supra note 42, at 131.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7. See also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 2. In full, the Charter states: "All Members, in order to
ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter."
Id.
68. Id. art. 1, 1 3, which states: "To achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;" Id. See also id. art. 55,
which states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
69. Delbraick, supra note 7, at 893; Ellerman, supra note 51, at 352.
70. Id. Such remedy must come under the enforcement measures of Chapter VII.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
71. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 569 (1992). See also S. PAVLOWrrCH, THE IMPROB-
ABLE SuRvrvoR: YuGosL WiA AND ITS PROBLEMS 1918-1988 64 (1988); B. McFAuuN,
YuaosLAvA: PoLmcs, ECONOMICS An Socxmy 2 (1988).
72. McAllister, supra note 4, at 23. Several discrete and insular minorities comprise
Yugoslavia's population. In 1988,41.5% of the Yugoslavian population was Serbian (9.3
million individuals), and 20.1% of the population was Croatian (4.6 million). McFAR-
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difficult to understand how intense ethnic hatred survives. Yet despite this
cultural diversity, ethnic divisions persist.73 Historians tract the genesis of
the present rigid ethnic divisions back over 600 years ago to the Battle of
Kosovo.74
During the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire expanded into
the region that was, until recently, Yugoslavia, and in 1389 the Ottoman
Turks soundly defeated the native Serbs, beginning a reign that would last
500 years.75 The decisive Turk victory at Kosovo strengthened the ethnic
cohesiveness of the three primary southern Slavic minorities: Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims. 76 When the Ottoman regime denied these minori-
ties both political and trade rights, and imposed burdensome taxes, the
Serbs retreated to the countryside and began to shun the cities.7 7 How-
ever, despite the social hardship, the rebellious Serbs struggled under
Ottoman rule and vigorously maintained their Eastern Orthodox faith. 78
Croats fared better under the Turkish domination of the region, and
Croatia received special treatment. 79 By 1699, after struggling with the
LAS, supra note 71, at xviii. There are also 4.1 million Bosnians and Hercegovinians
(18.7%) and 1.9 million Macedonians (8.2%). Id.
73. See infra part II.B, C.
74. Walter Russell Mead, West Can't Quell Balkan Hatreds, Resentment in Region is Cen-
tures 014 ATLANTAJ. & CoNsT., Aug. 16, 1992, at D2. See generally VLADIMIR DEDUER ET
AL., HIsTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA (Stephen Clissold ed., 1974). Some critics contend that
Kosovo, and the repression that followed, directly motivates the current conflict. Mead,
supra, at D2. A more likely explanation is that current political leaders have played
upon ethnic stereotypes to gain support for their movements. See, e.g., John Burns,
Serbian General is Either a Snake or a Charmer, Depending on the Beholder, N.Y. TimS, Aug. 8,
1993, at A14. Regardless of its origin, a very real spirit of ethnic animosity dominates
the conflict. See infra part H.C.
75. DEDIjER ET AL., supra note 74, at 115-16; Mead, supra note 74, at D2. For centu-
ries prior to Turkish ascendency, the Balkan states-such as Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia,
Zeta, and Dalmatia-maintained their independence through political maneuvering
between the Hungarian monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, both of which had designs
on the region. Id. at 127.
76. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. This cohesiveness arose, no doubt, as a result of the
fundamental realignment of the former states' political structures. See DEDUER ET AL.,
supra note 74, at 127.
77. DEDIJER ET AL., supra note 74, at 131. After the Serbs first arrived in the Balkan
region in the seventh century A.D., the internal clans struggled for five centuries, both
among themselves and with foreign influences, to establish a strong Serbian state. H.C.
DARBY ET AL, A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA FRoM EARLY TIMES TO 1966 87 (1966).
During the Nemanjid dynasty, under the leadership of Stefan Dusan, the Serbian state
reached its zenith. FRED SINGELTON, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES 23-24
(1985). Dusan combined Serbian customs with Byzantine law and introduced Serbia's
first legal code from 1349 to 1354. Id. at 25. The Serbian state fell to Turkish invasions
after Dusan's death, and remained under the influence of the Turks until the mid-19th
century. DARBY ET AL, supra, at 99-102.
78. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. Strong feelings of Serbian nationalism emerged in
the Serbs' struggle against Turkish rule, and the intensity of these feelings grew as the
19th century progressed. DARBY ET AL., supra note 77, at 118-19.
79. Id. The Croats arrived in the region in the seventh century A.D. and by the 10th
and 11th centuries the Croatian Kingdom flourished. SINGELTON, supra note 77, at 28-
29. However, by the 12th century the Croats came under the control of Hungary. Id. at
29. Throughout this era the Croats viewed themselves as a separate nation with merely
a common ruler. Id. Yet the Croatian status fluctuated from sovereign state to a vassal
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Turks for over 300 years, the Catholic Hapsburgs controlled most of mod-
ern-day Croatia.8 0 Although the Hapsburgs relegated native Croatians to
the status of second-class citizens, they did not view the Croats as rebels.
Unlike the Serbs, Croatians were free to develop their own culture within
the confines of Hapsburg Catholicism; the Croats, in return, proved to be
loyal subjects.8 '
The Battle of Kosovo had an important impact in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina.8 2 Prior to Kosovo, both Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats had
persecuted many Bosnians as "uncommitted" Christian "heretics."8 3 By
adopting the Islamic faith of their Ottoman conquerors, Bosnian converts
attained legal equality, and many of the upper class found this an opportu-
nity to preserve their status.8 4 However, both Serbs and Croats, who were
subjugated as defeated enemies, viewed this conversion as the ultimate
heresy, and the seeds for ethnic conflict began to take root.85
The collapse of both the Hapsburg and the Ottoman Empires at the
end of World War I finally provided the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims hope
for an opportunity to arrange their national affairs without outside inter-
ference.86 The Yugoslavia that emerged after World War I was an attempt
to unite the southern Slavs and serve as a counterweight to both Hungary
and Germany in the post-World War I balance of power.8 7 However, the
new nation shared only an intense mutual ethnic hatred and a superim-
Hungarian state to a Turkish region. Id. Because of their close affiliation to Hungary,
the Turks viewed the Croatian region with great caution and hesitated to provoke Hun-
gary. DEDIJER ET AT., supra note 74, at 184-85.
80. Mead, supra note 74, at D2.
81. Id. The Croats expressed their loyalty to Hungarian leadership in many ways,
but most significantly the Croats oversaw and led the Hungarian military. Id. Loyalty to
the leadership of the region ended with the emergence of modem Yugoslavia at the
end of World War I. Id. See also DEDuER Er Au., supra note 74, at 355.
82. Prior to Turkish ascendancy, spurred by the decline of the Byzantine empire,
many factions vied for rule of the territory currently known as Bosnia-Herzegovina.
DEDUER Er AL., supra note 74, at 59. By 1138, Bosnia was dominated by the Hungarian
empire, and the Hungarians allowed for independent internal development. Id. As a
result, the region failed to develop a strong church organization with significant ties to
either Catholicism or the Eastern Orthodox faith. Id.
83. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. Although a tenuous tolerance existed between the
Eastern Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croatians, both parties viewed the lack of
firm religious commitment as tantamount to "heresy." Id.
84. DEDUER ET Al., supra note 74, at 137. Although some Serbs, Croatians, and Bos-
nians converted to Islam, Bosnia was the site of the most widespread conversion. Id. at
180. This is probably because of the lack of strong church organization at the time of
Turkish ascendancy. Id.
85. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. The Turks further exacerbated the situation when
they forced Orthodox Serbs to work for a newly converted Bosnian aristocracy. DFUxE
Er Ai-, supra note 74, at 135. These insular minorities, which had constituted individual
states prior to Turkish ascendency, found the societal stratification based on religion
intolerable, and hence a greater basis for ethnic cohesion. Id.
86. Mead, supra note 74, at D2.
87. Henry Kissinger, Serbia Presents World with Inconceivable, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 20,
1992, at Al.
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posed language. 88 Internal ethnic and political conflict continued
through 1941 when Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia for refusing to facil-
itate Germany's invasion of Greece.89 The Nazis defeated a weak Yugosla-
via in less than a week, driving the rebellious Serbs back into the hills
where they renewed guerrilla warfare against the established leadership. 90
While the Serbs fled German oppression, many Croats viewed the Nazis as
liberators who displaced the oppressive Serbian dominated leadership of
Yugoslavia. 9 ' Ethnic division escalated further after the Nazi invasion as
Croatian Fascists sought to establish a "Greater Croatia."9 2 The new
regime served as a puppet to Nazi rule and converted or killed rebellious
Serbs.93
After World War II, Marshal Tito and the Yugoslavian Communists
came to power,94 killing tens of thousands of German collaborators and
non-Communist opponents in the -process.95 Tito's secret police intimi-
dated the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. 96 Atheist Communism attempted
to quell the various religious and ethnic aspirations by maintaining official
hostility toward all religions. 9 7 However, the Communists' threats and
intimidation could not eliminate the ethnic prejudice that had survived
88. Id. The founders of Yugoslavia erroneously assumed that "a Yugoslav nation
already existed, with a common language and a common sense of community."
SINGELToN, supra note 77, at 134.
89. Kissinger, supra note 87, at Al. The Declaration of Corfu onJuly 20, 1917 estab-
lished the foundation for a union among the various ethnic groups in the region.
DAxav Er A., supra note 77, at 162. The new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
which was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, initially adopted a parliamentary democracy.
McFARANE, supra note 71, at 4-6. When the parliamentary democracy failed, a royal
dictatorship followed, which in turn yielded to a mock parliamentary system. Id. The
Axis invasion in 1941 interrupted Yugoslavia's attempts to independently structure its
political regime. IR
90. Kissinger, supra note 87, at Al; DEDUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 569-70.
91. Kissinger, supra note 87, at Al. Serbs played a key role in the Declaration of
Corfu and from the beginning, conflict arose as to whether the Southern Slav state was
an equal partnership-according to the Croat view-or an "enlarged Serbia"-as the
Serbs believed. SINGELTON, supra note 77, at 125-27. By 1941, the Serbs had succeded
in dominating the Yugoslav government, and many Croats encouraged the Nazi inva-
sion. Kissinger, supra note 87, at Al.
92. Mead, supra note 74, at D2; SINGELTON, supra note 77, at 175-77. The Nazis
established the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska or "NDH").
Id. at 175. This regime, however, possessed little independence and neither received
international recognition nor could act without the permission of occupying Axis
forces. Id at 177.
93. Mead, supra note 74, at D2; SrNGELTON, supra note 77, at 177. Serbia claimed
that the NDH killed 750,000 Serbs, while Germany estimated 350,000 Serbs were killed.
I. The Nuremberg trials later judged the extermination process as genocide. Id.
94. SINGLETON, supra note 77, at 207-09.
95. Kissinger, supra note 87, at Al.
96. Id.
97. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. Historians generally credit Tito with spurring great
social, economic, cultural, and political changes in Yugoslavia, seeking above all else to
preserve Yugoslavian unity. See generally STEvEN L. BuRG, CoNrucr AND COHFSION IN
SociaLsr YuGosLAVL., PoLriCAL DECISION MAKING SINCE 1966 (1983); ALsSKA DJuAs,
THE Com'EsraE CoUNer, YuOosLAv UNX, AND COMMUNIST REVoLUTnON 1919-1953
(1991).
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over 500 years of Ottoman oppression. The Serbs desperately sought to
infiltrate and dominate the government and armed forces.98 While the
other nationalities resisted the Serbs' attempts,99 Tito's death in 1980
removed the control of a powerful federal government, allowing the
republics to exercise greater individual autonomy.' 00
B. The Current Conflict
Prior to its recent dissolution, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
consisted of six republics-Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter "Bosnia"),
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia-and two "autono-
mous" regions-Kosovo and Vojvodina.' 0 1 A Presidential Council con-
trolled the Federal Government.' 0 2 The chairmanship of this collective
presidency rotated among the leadership of the republics and autono-
mous territories according to a schedule established by the Yugoslavian
Constitution.103
Formal dissolution of the Federal Republic began on September 27,
1990 when the Slovenian Parliament proclaimed that it would not apply
federal legislation within the Republic of Slovenia.'0 4 The movement for
independence soon spread, and by late December 1990, the Croatian Par-
liament declared that Croatian law would supersede federal legislation.' 0 5
On December 23, 1990, in a special referendum election, nearly ninety
98. Mead, supra note 74, at D2. This reaction may relate to the Serbs' historical
attempt to establish a "Greater Serbia." See supra note 91; infra note 128. Historians
often trace the desire to create a "Greater Serbia" to an organization known as the
Black Hand, founded in the early 20th century by Serbian army officers who sought to
create a regime founded on the policy of military expansion. SiNGELTON, supra note 77,
at 116. The Black Hand is credited with sparking World War I when one of its conspira-
tors, Gavrilo Princip, assasinated the heir to the Hapsburg throne, Archduke Franz Fer-
dinand. Id. at 117.
99. Mead, supra note 74, at D2.
100. LeonardJ. Cohen, Regime in Transition in a Disintegrating Yugoslavia: The Law-of-
Rule vs. The Rule-of-Law, 908 CaR. BEcK PAPERas 5 (1992). See also Kissinger, supra note
87, at Al.
101. Weller, supra note 71, at 569. On January 21, 1946, the Constituent Assembly,
which had abolished the former monarchy of the region in favor of a unified state with
a republican form of government, adopted the Constitution of the Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FPR"), based on the principles of democratic centralism and
unity of authority. DanDu- zr At., supra note 74, at 698. The FPR was to be composed
of six republics-Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Mon-
tenegro. Id. The "autonomous" provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were to be located
within the Serbian Republic. Id.
102. Weller, supra note 71, at 569.
103. I&
104. I& The lack of a strong central authority, combined with Serbian attempts to
dominate Yugoslavia's political and economic structure, served as the foundation for
the republics' movements for independence. See generally id at 569-70.
105. Id. at 569. See also Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Committee Opinion No. 1, 31
I.L.M. 1494, 1496 (1992) [hereinafter Arbitration Opinion No. 1]. Croatia held a referen-
dum election in May 1991 on the issue of independence and formally declared its inde-
pendence on June 25, 1991. Id. Enactment of the declaration was suspended until
October 8, 1991. Id.
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percent of the Slovenian voters chose independence. 10 6
The republics within Yugoslavia began to negotiate the preservation
of the Federal Government in the spring of 1991.107 Discord soon arose,
however, concerning the magnitude of federal power.' 08 Unlike the
Serbs, who had previously dominated the federation's political structure,
the Croats and Slovenes sought a loose federation, free from Serbian dom-
ination. 10 9 When the other republics agreed upon the basic function and
structure of a new Yugoslavia, the Serbs stormed out of the negotia-
tions.1 10 To maintain control over the Yugoslavian federation, the Serb
military leadership explicitly disregarded the federal presidency, and
declared martial law.'1 '
Serbia further exacerbated the delicate situation by blocking the
scheduled election of Stipe Mesic, a Croat, to the federal presidency. 112
In response to Serbia's denial of Mesic's constitutional right to the federal
presidency under Yugoslavian law, Croatia overwhelmingly voted to secede
from the federation on May 19, 1991.113 Despite warnings by the Yugoslav
Prime Minister that the Federal Government would use force to prevent
unilateral secession, both Slovenia and Croatia formally declared indepen-
dence on June 25, 1991.114 On June 27, in an attempt to prevent seces-
sion, the armed forces of the central authorities attacked the provisional
Slovenian militia.115
106. Weller, supra note 71, at 569 (88.5% chose independence). Id. See also Arbitra-
tion Opinion No. 1, supra note 105, at 1496. Slovenia officially delcared independence
on June 25th, 1991, but suspended enactment until October 8, 1991. Id.
107. Weller, supra note 71, at 569.
108. Id. The initial disagreements among the parties centered on the relative
strength of the central government. Id. at 569-570. In a referendum election in Sep-
tember 1991, Macedonian citizens voted "in favour of a sovereign and independent
Macedonia" to be associated within a Yugoslav federation of States. Arbitration Opinion
No. 1, supra note 105, at 1496. The Serbs wished to preserve their control over the
region through a strong centralized government, while the other republics sought a
loose federation to dilute Serbian influence. Weller, supra note 71, at 569. See also
Graff, Yugoslavia: Dangerous Muddle, TPAE, May 27, 1991, at 37; Yugoslavia: Humpty
Dumpty, TujE, Apr. 1, 1991, at 50.
109. Weller, supra note 71, at 569.
110. Id. at 569-70.
111. Id. at 570. Under the constitutional arrangements of the federation, the federal
president possessed the power to act as commander in chief of the Yugoslav military.
Id. The declaration of martial law by the Serbian military leadership expressly contra-
dicted the position of the current federal president. Id
112. Id. Despite Croatia's threat to secede if Mesic was not elected, Serbia succeeded
in obtaining the support of Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina to block the scheduled
election. Id.
113. Id. (93.24% approved the referendum). Id.
114. Id. On June 24, 1991, the Yugoslav Prime Minister warned that "the Federal
Government will use all means available to stop the republics' unilateral steps toward
independence." Id. Their objection to the republics' ability to unilaterally secede
seems to constitute the foundation of the Serb argument against independence. See
infra note 169 and accompanying text.
115. Weller, supra note 71, at 570. In response, the Slovenian authorities declared
that a "state of war" existed and sought assistance from the European Community, Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the United Nations. Id.
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Hostilities soon spread to Croatia, where Serbian rebels, supported by
Federal Government forces, accused Croatian authorities of unconstitu-
tionally arming nationalist groups. 1 6 The small Serbian population,
inhabiting ethnic enclaves in Croatia, decided to remain within the federa-
tion of Yugoslavia and seceded from Croatia. 1 7 The Federal Government
justified its support of these rebel forces by claiming it sought to protect
the legitimate "national and civil rights" of fellow Serbs.
118
The movement for independence spread, and by January 26, 1992,
the Bosnian parliament voted to hold a national referendum on indepen-
dence.1 1 9 Nearly sixty-three percent of the voters approved the subse-
quent referendum.' 20 In early March, Bosnian authorities declared that if
the Federal Government forces did not leave Bosnia after it officially pro-
claimed its independence, Bosnian authorities would regard the federal
troops as an occupying force.' 21 By April, Serbian leaders within Bosnia,
taking their cue from ethnic Serbs in Croatia and the Federal Govern-
ment, repudiated Bosnian independence and began a violent movement
to overthrow the Bosnian leadership in Sarajevo and prevent international
recognition.' 22 Serbian rebels, supported by the heavily armed federal
forces, soon gained control of significant portions of Bosnia.'
23
C. The Role of "Ethnic Cleansing"
The policy of "ethnic cleansing"-the systematic removal of the members
of one ethnic group by the members of another in an attempt to "purify"
territorial regions124-began soon after the outbreak of violence in Bos-
nia.125 The displacement of ethnic minorities is the purpose of ethnic
cleansing rather than a side-effect.126 To achieve this objective, initially
Serbs, and now Croats and Bosnians as well, use tactics reminiscent of the
Nazi war crimes of World War 11.127
116. Id. at 574.
117. Id.
118. Id. The support of Serbian rebel forces was justified as "essential to protect the
Serbian people from extermination." Id.
119. Id. at 597 n.163. The referendum came in response to a challenge by the Ser-
bian community within Bosnia to the validity of the sovereignty resolution adopted by
the Bosnian Parliament on October 14, 1991. See Arbitration Opinion No. 1, supra note
105, at 1496.
120. Bosnia Leader Warns Serbs to Respect Vote Verdict THE Tissas (London), Mar. 4,
1992, at 8.
121. Weller, supra note 71, at 597 n.163.
122. Id. at 597.
123. Id. Bosnian authorities attempted to respond to the rapid spread of hostilities
by mobilizing territorial defense units, but these units proved no match for the arma-
ments, including air forces, supplied by the central authorities. Id.
124. Watson et al., supra note 4, at 16; McAllister, supra note 4, at 21-23.
125. Watson et al., supra note 4, at 16.
126. Stanley Meisler, Bosnia Muslims Face Extinction, U.N. Study Says, L.A. TrmEs, Oct.
29, 1992, at Al; Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protec-
tion, 26 CoRNELL INrr'L LJ. 495, 500 (1993).
127. See, e.g.,Jamal Kaj, The Serb Savagery in Bosnia is Reminiscent of Hitler's Nazis, SAN
Djco UNIoN-TRIB., July 24, 1993, at B1l; Anthony Bazcarich, Holocaust in Bosnia, LA.
TiMEs, July 23, 1993, at B6; Elaine Sciolino, In Bosnia, Peace at Any Price is Getting More
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Although no one knows exactly where or when the practice of ethnic
cleansing began, most reported incidents involve alleged abuses by Bos-
nian Serbs.128 Serbian leaders deny the existence of the practice;129 how-
ever, many observers posit that ethnic cleansing began as part of a plan to
create a "Greater Serbia." °3 0 Despite the large number of incidents involv-
ing Serbian soldiers and Bosnian Muslim civilians, more recent reports
indicate that the practice has spread, and the list of victims has grown to
include both Serbs and Groats.15 '
A growing body of evidence suggests that Serbs, and others responsi-
ble for practicing ethnic cleansing, have undertaken genocide.'5 2 Rumors
Fxpensive, N.Y. Tvmms,Jan. 10, 1993, at D4; Michael Getler, Horrors of the Conflict in Bosnia
Recall the Nazi Nightmare ofa Half-Centuy Ago, WASH. Posr, Dec. 21, 1992, at A14; CarolJ.
Williams, West Seeking Consensus on Halting Balkan Horrors, LA. TiMEs, Aug. 24, 1992, at
Al. Professor Cherif Bassiouni is leading a team to collect evidence of abuses commit-
ted in Yugoslavia in an attempt to facilitate the prosecution of War Crimes. Stephen
Franklin & Terry Atlas, Chicagoans Help U.N. Compile Bosnia War Crimes, CHi. TRIB., Aug.
30, 1993, at 1.
128. On May 12, 1992, in a report on the situation in Bosnia, the Secretary-General
stated: "[A]U international observers agree that what is happening is a concerted effort
by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and at least some
support from, the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], to create 'ethnically pure' regions
.... " Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749
(1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23900 (1992).
129. Both Slobodan Mislovec, the Serbian Prime Minister, and Radovan Karadzic,
the leader of the Serbian rebel forces in Bosnia, have denied responsibility for ethnic
cleansing and have considered it a practice exercised only by Serb irregulars. McAl-
lister, supra note 4, at 21-23; Laura Silber, Serbs Agree to Allow Red Cross Into Camps, WASH.
Posr, Aug. 9, 1992, at Al. However, the Serbian central government authorities con-
tinue to arm Serb rebels responsible for displacing hundreds of thousands of Muslims
in both Bosnia and Croatia. McAllister, supra note 4, at 21-23; Silber, supra, at Al.
130. McAllister, supra note 4, at 23. See also Trevor Rowe, U.N. Report: Serb Actions
Undermining World Body, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1992, at A12; Thom Shanker, Bosnian
Truce at Last? Winter, War Gains Favor Cease-fire, Cm. TRm., Nov. 11, 1992, at 1; Anthony
Lewis, Abroad at Home; Suffer the Children, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at A17; J.F.O. McAl-
lister, Ever Greater Serbia, TIME, Sept. 28, 1992, at 55.
131. Roy Gutman, Croat "Cleansing"Freed Muslims Tell of Brutality by Their Former Allies,
NEWSDAY, July 23, 1993, at 8; Estelle Lander, New Report on Atrocities, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7,
1992, at 4; John F. Burns, In a "Cleansed"Bosnian Town, Croats, Not Serbs, Aim Guns, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al.
132. See, eg., Croatians Hold 1,300 Muslims, CHI. TRm., May 12, 1993, at 1; Bruce W.
Nelan, More Harm Than Good, TnAE, Mar. 15, 1993, at 40; Saul Friedman, 70,000 Bosni-
ans in Secret Camps, NEwSDAv, Jan. 7, 1993, at 15 [hereinafter 70,000 Bosnians in Secret
Camps]; Frank McCloskey, The U.S. Is AppeasingFacism and Genocide, CHuSIAN Sci. MoN-
rroR, Dec. 31, 1992, at 19; Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures It Wants Charged With War
Crimes, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al; Saul Friedman, 75,000 Bosnians Held; Serbs Eye
Next Push, NEwsDAY, Dec. 16, 1992 at 17 [hereinafter 75,000 Bosnians Held]; Mary Bat-
tiata, Serbs Stymie UN, Step-Up "Cleansing" WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 1992, at A25 [hereinafter
Serbs Stymie U.N.]; Bill Gertz, Serbian Warlord Called "QCriminal" by U.S. Offical WASH.
TI ms, Dec. 1, 1992, at A7; Lander, supra note 131; Cornfield May Hold 300 Killed by Serbs,
CH. TRm., Nov. 29, 1992, at 4; Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Investigating Groats' Grave Site, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al; Rowe, supra note 130; Mary Battiata, Bosnian Serb Police Unit
is Accused of Massacre of Muslim Prisoners, WASH. Posr, Sept. 22, 1992, at A17; Nina Bern-
stein, Trapped in Bosnia: Mentally Disabled Left Behind, NEwSDAY, Aug. 29, 1992, at 67
[hereinafter Trapped in Bosnia]; A.D. Home, UN. Inspection Team Barred From Serb-Run
Prison Camp in Bosnia, WASH. Posr, Aug. 25, 1992, at A10; Nina Bernstein & Roy Gut-
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of possible Serb abuses first surfaced in June 1992, and by August, reports
of abuse had escalated to such a level that Serb authorities, after initial
refusal,' 3 3 offered to allow the International Red Cross access to their
detention camps in an attempt to preclude international intervention.' 34
After inviting Red Cross inspections, however, Serb leaders went to great
pains to see that inspectors discovered no mistreatment by relocating tens
of thousands of prisoners, orchestrating prisoner interviews, removing evi-
dence of abuses and refusing to permit unannounced inspections.1 3 5
The extensive list of official and unofficial reports of systematic kill-
ings includes the following:
" An August 21, 1992 massacre of over 200 Muslim men and boys by Serb
police in the Vlasica mountains in Central Bosnia;13 6
" The murder of 2,000 to 3,000 Muslim men, women, and children in May
and June of 1992 by Serb irregulars at a brick factory and pig farm near
Brko; l3 7
" The May 18, 1992 murder of 56 Muslims by Serb militiamen in
Grbavci; 38
" The regular, daily execution of 20 Muslim prisoners held by Serbs at the
Omarska Camp in central Bosnia;' 3 9
" Serb soldiers breaking the necks of Muslim children abandoned in a
hospital; 140
" The November 20, 1991 mass killing of 300 Muslims by Serb soldiers
outside Vukovar;141 and,
" The execution of as many as 5,000 Muslims in late May of 1992 by Ser-
bian forces in the town of Kozarac. 1
4 2
By the end of 1992, one report estimated that Serb forces had killed as
many as 200,000 Bosnian Muslims (nearly ten percent of the Muslim pop-
ulation).14 Despite the international outcry,'4 and denial by Serb lead-
ers of "systematic" executions, by early 1993 sources reported that Serbs
man, Inmate Shuffle; Serbs Invite Inspection, But Evidence of Atrocities Removed, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 21, 1992, at 3; Silber, supra note 129.
133. Bernstein & Gutman, supra note 132.
134. Silber, supra note 129. Radovan Karadzic attributed the publicity surrounding
the allegations of "ethnic cleansing" to a plot designed to encourage foreign interven-
tion. I&
135. Bernstein & Gutman, supra note 132. Serb leaders also refused to allow U.N.
inspectors access to detention camps to conduct their own investigation. Home, supra
note 132.
136. Sciolino, supra note 132.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Lander, supra note 131.
140. Id.
141. Cornfield May Hold 300 Killed by Serbs, supra note 132. See also Sudetic, supra note
132.
142. Rowe, supra note 130.
143. McCloskey, supra note 132. Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, dispatched to examine the crisis in the Balkan region, stated, "if
only 10% of the information [reports regarding alleged atrocities] is true, we are wit-
nessing a massacre." Nelan, supra note 132.
144. Sciolino, supra note 132; Gertz, supra note 132.
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held as many as 75,000 Bosnians in concentration camps.14 5 Serb leaders
seemed either unwilling or unable to prevent continued atrocities.' 46
In addition to genocide, reports accuse Serbs of attempting to destroy
the Muslim national, religious, and cultural identity through the system-
atic rape of Muslim women.' 4 7 Although both Muslims and Croats are
also responsible for widespread rape, only Serbs appear to have used rape
145. 70,000 Bosnians in Scret Camps, supra note 132; 75,000 Bosnians Hel supra note
132.
146. Serbs Stymie U.N., supra note 132. See also Trapped in Bosnia, supra note 132.
Reports accused Serbs of relying heavily on "cultural devastation" to accomplish their
goals. "Cultural devastation" refers to the practice of targeting Muslim cultural sites for
destruction in an attempt to rid the region of all Islamic influences. Roy Gutman,
Unholy War: Serbs Target Culture, Heritage of Bosnia's Muslims, NEWSDAY, Sept. 2, 1992, at 3
[hereinafter Unholy War]. See also Roy Gutman, The New Enemy: Serbs at Bay, Bosnian
Town Fights Hunger, NEwsDAY, Aug. 20, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter New Enemy]; Charles T.
Powers, Fear and Hopelessness Grip Muslims in a Bosnian Town, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1992,
at Al. On April 8, 1992, in the town of Zvornik, Serbs allegedly destroyed or damaged
19 mosques. Unholy War, supra. Reports accuse Serbs of destroying 90% of the mosques
in areas that they occupy, as well as executing, detaining, or expelling from Bosnia
more than 370 imains-Muslim clergymen. Id. Serb'rebels reportedly utilize various
means to terrorize and dishearten the Muslim population. From the minaret (the
tower used to call Muslims to prayer) of one seized mosque, Serb rebels have hung a
skull-and-crossbones flag and continually blast tapes of Serbian nationalist songs riddled
with threats meant to intimidate the Muslim population. Id. One recording has been
reported to play repeatedly: "If you're not with us, we will kill you. We will slit your
throats;" and "You're a liar if you say Serbia is small." Id.
In addition to reducing the vast majority of Muslim historical sites to rubble, Serbs
have repeatedly attempted to force Muslim leaders to desecrate their religious institu-
tions. In the village of Novo Selo, Serbs forced 150 Muslim women and children to
watch as they attempted to force a local leader to make the sign of the cross, eat pork,
and have sexual intercourse with a teenage girl. Id. When the leader refused, he was
beaten, cut with knives, and dragged away. Id. Similar reports abound accusing Serbs
of regularly rounding up Muslims to watch as their leaders are beaten, forced to violate
Muslim religious law, and then killed. Id. See also Roy Gutman, Hatred Up Close, Bosnia:
'Terrible Things are Happening Please Come;" NEWSDAY, Dec. 31, 1992, at 101; Sarajevo
Witness, WASH. Posr, Dec. 8, 1992, at A18; Tadeuz Mazowiecki, Witness to Horror:. "Ethnic
Cleansing" Threatens the Concept of Human Rights Everywhere, WASH. PosT, Nov. 29,1992, at
C7; Bujar Bukoshi, Serbia's Next Victim, WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 1992, at A23. Serbs have
also been reported to have used mosques as slaughterhouses, morgues, and prisons,
forcing thousands of prisoners to eat pork or starve, and denying them access to toilets,
permitting them only to relieve themselves in sacred ablution basins. Unholy War, supra.
Many believe that these tactics have already helped to cleanse these areas "psychologi-
cally" of any Muslim influence. Powers, supra.
In addition, reports abound accusing soldiers of forcing Muslims to leave their homes
and sign over all legal rights to their property in exchange for the opportunity to leave
communities where they regularly face starvation and threats of violence. Id. See also
New Enemy, supra; Mary Battiata, New Wave of Terror Described to U.N., E.C. Envoys, WASH.
Posr, Sept. 26, 1992, at A16; Roy Gutman, Serb Terror Continues: Armies Ignore Massacre
Deadline, NEwsDAY, Sept. 15, 1992, at 7; A.D. Home, Muslims in Serb-Run Town Tell of
Repression and Worry About Worse WASH. Posr, Aug. 17, 1992, at A10.
147. Lance Morrow, Unspeakable, TimE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 48. See also Tom Squitieri, At
Shelter, Victims Share Horror of Rape, USA TODAY, July 8, 1993, at AS; Leslie Sowers, Angered
into Action; Use of Rape as a War Tactic in the Bosnian Conflict Has Prompted Muslim Women
to Unite in Rare Public Protest; Hous. CHmoN.,June 8, 1993, at 1; Sciolino, supra note 127;
Peter Maass, The Rapes in Bosnia: A Muslim Schoolgirl's Account, WAsH. Posr, Dec. 27,
1992, at Al.
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as a tool to achieve their goal of ethnic cleansing.148 Reports contend that
Serbs round up Muslim women and girls, and take them to "camps"
located in seized inns, hotels, schools, town halls, and restaurants where
they are raped by scores of Serb soldiers.' 49 After the Serbs finish raping
their victims, they either release them, kill them, or transfer the women to
the larger Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia.150 One captured Serb
soldier admitted to being ordered to rape Muslim women and kill them
after the incident.' 5 1
Bosnian authorities report that Serbs have raped as many as 50,000
Muslim women.' 5 2 To Bosnians, the two-fold purpose of this form of Ser-
bian aggression is apparent. Rape not only shatters the identity and
morale of the individual woman and her community, but also weakens her
group's religious and cultural identity in a region that places the utmost
value on racial purity.15 3 To Serbs, mass rape achieves the objective of
ethnic cleansing by polluting the Muslim gene pool.'
5 4
I. Failure of the Established Legal Structure
A. The International Response
1. Initial Diplomatic Mediation
After the outbreak of violence in June 1991, the European Community
("E.C.") responded quickly by sponsoring peace talks.' 55 By August 1992,
the failure of both U.N. and E.C. mediators to reach a peaceful solution,
and the public outcry over the alleged human rights violations in Serbian
detention camps, prompted both Central Intelligence Agency and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee investigations.' 5 6 Although these initial
reports noted that human rights abuses-such as "killing and tor-
ture"' 5 7-had occurred at Serbian detention camps, and the camps often
amounted to "centers for systematic torture and murder,"' 5 8 they con-
cluded that "no evidence of a concerted plan to kill systematically the Mus-
lim population" existed.'5 9
148. Morrow, supra note 147, at 49.
149. Id. The Serb soldiers often euphamistically refer to this systematic rape as
"interrogation." Id.
150. Id,
151. Maass, supra note 147.
152. Morrow, supra note 147, at 48. A more "moderate" estimate by the European
Community places the number of women raped as a part of the Serbian campaign at
20,000. Sciolino, supra note 127.
153. Morrow, supra note 147, at 48-49.
154. Id. at 49.
155. Weller, supra note 71, at 571.
156. David Binder, U.S. Finds No Proof of Mass Killing at Serb Camps, N.Y. Tifms, Aug.
23, 1992, at A18.
157. Id.
158. John M. Goshko, "Ethnic Cleansing" by Serb Militias Found to Result in Many Deaths,
WASH. Posr, Aug. 19, 1992, at A15.
159. Binder, supra note 156.
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In September 1991, the U.N. responded to the outbreak of violence
in the former Yugoslavia by imposing an arms embargo on all parties to
the conflict 160 Resolution 713 expressed the international community's
refusal to recognize territorial gains that resulted from violence. 161 The
resolution also declared that "the continuation of this situation constitutes
a threat to international peace and security."16 2 While the U.N.'s initial
response carried forward the efforts of the E.C. to mediate a peaceful reso-
lution, the U.N. also called on all states to do their best to facilitate a
peaceful resolution, 163 and imposed upon all states a duty of
nonintervention.'6
After the adoption of Resolution 713, the Secretary-General of the
U.N. contacted Lord Carrington (the chairman of the peace conference
on Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, and representa-
tives of the E.G., the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
("C.S.C.E."), and neighboring states to arrange and promote peace negoti-
ations. 165 The Secretary-General also contacted Cyrus Vance, requesting
that he act as the Secretary's personal envoy.166
From the outset, Serbian forces within Yugoslavia resisted a peaceful
resolution. After the adoption of Resolution 713, four Serbian members
of the Yugoslav federal presidency, without the approval of the remaining
members, but with the consent of senior military officials (who were also
Serbian), decided to conduct federation affairs independently. 167 Serbian
authorities also resisted several agreements that would have brought about
a peaceful resolution.' 68 Serbs deemed one agreement unsuitable
because they claimed it "recognized the legality of unilateral secession." 169
160. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/713
(1991).
161. Id. at 2. The General Assembly also officially declared its adherence to this prin-
ciple. See infra note 181.
162. S.C. Res. 713, supra note 160, at 1.
163. Id. at 2. For a comprehensive description of the U.N.'s initial response to the
crisis, see Weller, supra note 71, at 577-580.
164. S.C. Res. 713, supra note 160, at 3.
165. Weller, supra note 71, at 581.
166. Id. From the outset, representatives of influential states and organizations-
such as the United States, European Community, and Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe-voiced their support for maintaining the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. Id. at 570. Critics contend this action was inappropriate and strengthened
the intransigence of the Serb leadership in the negotiations. I&
167. Id. at 581. The result of this action was the creation of the "rump presidency"
which impaired the authority and legitimacy of the central government in subsequent
dealings with the republics. Report of the Secretaiy-General Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of S.C.
Res. 713 (1991), paras. 21, 31, U.N. Doc. S/23169 (1991). To complicate matters fur-
ther, Slovenia and Croatia responded by implementing declarations of independence
that had previously been suspended by the terms of the initial ceasefire agreement of
June 25, 1991. Ceasefire as Croats Declare Indedpendence, THE TimES (London), Oct. 9,
1991, at 1.
168. See, e.g., Weller, supra note 71, at 581-83.
169. U.N. Doc. S/23169, supra note 167, para. 23. The agreement would have: (1)
formed an alliance of sovereign republics, (2) provided for adequate protection of
minority human rights, and (3) recognized only agreed-upon changes in borders-
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Serbia continued to resist peace agreements despite the threat of trade
sanctions from the European Community. After the E.G. deadline of
November 5, 1991 passed without Serbian concessions, the E.G. imposed
sanctions.170
By late February 1992, in response to the frequent violations of the
initial cease-fire agreement between Croatia and Serbia, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 743.171 Under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter,
the resolution called for the development of a peace-keeping force to pro-
vide humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and supervise the withdrawal of
federal troops from Croatia.172 However, despite the presence of U.N.
Protection Forces, the situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate and
Bosnian Serbs increased their "ethnic cleansing" practices.173 By May, the
Secretary-General determined the situation unfit for peace-keeping treat-
ment.174 Instead, the Security Council adopted Resolution 752, which
mandated that all parties in Bosnia observe the ceasefire agreement of
April 12 and cooperate in peace-keeping negotiations.175 The resolution
also required all parties to ensure safe conditions to facilitate the distribu-
tion of humanitarian aid in the region.176 When the parties in Bosnia
failed to comply, the Security Council, attempting to force compliance,
adopted Resoultion 757 and imposed strict economic sanctions. 177
Before the Security Council imposed economic sanctions, the United
Nations General Assembly passed three resolutions which characterize the
nature of the Yugoslav conflict. On May 22, 1992, after receiving the rec-
ommendations of the Security Council, the General Assembly admitted
the Republic of Slovenia, 178 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina i7 9
and the Republic of Croatia 80 as members of the United Nations. Such
Serbs continued to assert the objection that unilateral secession is impermissable, yet
did little to negotiate a peaceful resolution. See, e.g., Weller, supra note 71, at 581-83.
170. Id. at 583.
171. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743
(1992).
172. Id. See also U.N. Peace Keepers Deployed, WASH. PosT, Jan. 18, 1992, at A24. The
initial force was to contain 13,870 personnel. Id.
173. Weller, supra note 71, at 602.
174. Further Report of the Seeretaro-General Pursuant to S.C. Res. 749 (1992), para. 25,
U.N. Doc. S/23900 (1992). Pursuant to a report by Under-Secretary General for Peace-
Keeping Operations, who the U.N. dispatched in April 1992 to investigate the feasibility
of peace-keeping forces in the area, the Secretary- General found that the lack of agree-
ment among the principal parties to the conflict prevented the U.N. from deploying a
traditional peace-keeping force. See Weller, supra note 71, at 601-02.
175. S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3075th mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/752
(1992).
176. Id.
177. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992).
178. G.A. Res. 236, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 5, U.N. Doc. 46/236
(1992).
179. G.A. Res. 237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 5, U.N. Doc. 46/237
(1992).
180. GA-. Res. 238, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 5, U.N. Doc. 46/238
(1992).
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action recognized the validity of each republic's secession from the former
Yugoslavia. l 8 '
By September 22, 1992, the parties had failed to reach a peaceful solu-
tion. In an unprecedented move, the General Assembly voted (127 to 6)
to ban Yugoslavia from voting and speaking in the General Assembly and
its committees.1 8 2 United States Ambassador Edward Perkins interpreted
the U.N. declaration as stating that the original federation ceased to exist,
and consequently "its membership in the United Nations has therefore
expired."' 8 3
In the Fall of 1992, the Security Council instituted a number of meas-
ures that served as little more than lip-service to halting the Balkan atroci-
ties. On October 6, the Security Council voted unanimously to establish a
war-crimes commission to collect evidence of human rights violations
within the former Yugoslav federation, and to decide which individuals
should face prosecution.' 8 4 Despite its apparent vehement intent to inter-
vene and bring human rights violators to justice, the Security Council
waited nearly a year to establish a tribunal to decide the cases of those that
181. In Resolution 242 the General Assembly recognized Bosnia as an independent
and sovereign nation under international law and stated:
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the necessity of respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
political independence and national unity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and rejecting any attempt to change the boundaries of that Republic,
Reaffirming also the inherent right of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter,
1. Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately stop fighting and find
a peaceful solution in line with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples of international law, in particular the principles of respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity of States, non-recognition of the fruits of aggression
and non-recognition of the acquisition of territory by force;
2. Demands also that all forms of interference from outside the Republic o
Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately;
3. Demands further that those units of the Yugoslav People's Army and ele-
ments of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be
withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under
effective international monitoring, and requests the Secretary-General to con-
sider without delay what kind of international assistance could be provided in
this connection;
4. Reaffirms its support for the Government and people of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in their just struggle to safeguard their sovereignty,
political independence, territorial integrity and unity;,
G.A. Res. 242, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. 46/242 (1992)
(emphasis in original).
182. GA. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 12, U.N. Doc. 47/1 (1992).
See also Despite Last-Minute Plea, U.N. Expels Yugoslavia, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 23, 1992, at 1
[hereinafater U.N. Expels Yugoslavia].
183. U.N. Expels Yugoslavia, supra note 182.
184. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., at 25, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771
(1992).
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the war-crimes commission should recommend for prosecution. 185
On October 9, 1992, the U.N. took further steps to prevent Serbian
aggression from disrupting the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies by
imposing a "No-Fly" Zone over Bosnia.' 8 6 The U.N., however, failed to
provide additional forces to allow the U.N. Protection Force to enforce
any future violation of the "No-Fly" Zone.18 7 Furthermore, despite the
strong rhetoric by both U.S. Amassador Edward Perkins and Sir David
Hannay, the British U.N. Ambassador,' 88 reports of Serb violations
abounded on two of the first four days after the resolution's adoption. 8 9
Serb violations prompted an immediate controversy among the allies
about both the extent of a violation required to prompt enforcement
measures, and the proper response to such a violation. 1 90
As peace efforts stagnated, U.N. inspectors conducted investigations
that contradicted prior inquiries and revealed that human rights violations
in Bosnia had worsened.' 9 1 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, official U.N. human
rights investigator, noted the grave danger faced by Bosnia's Muslims and
stated, "[e]thnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the
war but rather its goal."19 2 A more chilling revelation came when he
stated, "[tlhis goal, to a large extent, has already been achieved through
killings, beatings, rape, destruction of houses and threats."193
2. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan & U.S. Participation
In early February 1993, international mediators Cyrus Vance, representing
the U.N., and Lord Owen, representing the E.C., proposed a plan to bring
peace to the region. At renewed negotiations between Serbs, Croats, and
Bosnians, the mediators proposed a plan that would allow Bosnia to
185. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th- Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993). Paul Lewis, UN. Sets Up War-Crimes Panel on Charges of Balkan Atrocities, N.Y.
TiMEs, Oct. 7, 1992, at Al. See also Franklin & Atlas, supra note 127.
186. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122nd mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781
(1992). See also "No-17y" Zone Over Bosnia O.K 'd by U.N., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992, atA8
[hereinafter "No-Fly" Zone O.K'd].
187. S.C. Res. 781, supra note 186, at 27.
188. Perkins stated, "If... the current resolution is violated, my government will
move to seek adoption by the council of a further resolution mandating enforcement of
a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina." "No-Fly" Zone O.K 'd, supra note 186, at A8. In
addition, Hannay stated, "Anybody who thinks that they can flout this ban without
being found out is going to be badly surprised. And anybody who thinks that, having
been found out, no action will be taken, will also be badly surprised." Id.
189. Jackson Diehl & Barton Gillman, Enforcement of Bosnia "No-Fly" Zone Weighed,
WAsH. Posr, Oct. 14, 1992, at A25. See also Lucia Mouat, U.N. Weighs Credibility Risks of
Enforcing Bosnian No-Fly Zone, CHIsrIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1993, at 1.
190. Diehl & Gillman, supra note 189. U.N. efforts to impose a naval blockade of
Serbia have likewise proved ineffective. William Drozdiak, NATO Agrees to Impose Block-
ade of Serbia, WAH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1992, at A31. Despite NATO's efforts to enforce a
U.N. blockade of Serbia, the effort has failed to stem the flow of contraband into the
region. Id. See also David H. Hackworth, The Blockade Is ajoke, NEwswEEc, Oct. 12, 1992,
at 46.
191. Meisler, supra note 124.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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remain a sovereign nation, but would divide it into ten autonomous
regions controlled by a loose central government.1 94 The plan granted
one minority control of each region, and all armed ethnic forces would
retreat to a region governed by their ethnic minority.195 In addition, the
plan permitted the U.N. to monitor weapons movements to enforce the
plan and to ensure freedom of movement for all ethnic groups in the
area.196 The plan also called for a strong central government mechanism
to enforce human rights and reverse the results of ethnic cleansing. 197
Despite the widespread international and European support for the
plan, only the Croatian delegation fully accepted it.19 8 Serbs objected to
the plan because it required them to surrender approximately thirty-nine
percent of the land they had captured in the course of the civil war.199 A
more strenuous objection arose from Bosnia's Muslim-led government,
however, which claimed that the plan's provision for Serbs to control
three of the autonomous provinces, covering forty-three percent of Bos-
nia's geographical territory, would condone Serbian aggression in the con-
flict and would constitute a "vot[e] for ethnic cleansing."200 The Bosnian
government further halted the negotiations by listing demands which the
Serbs and Croats must meet prior to continuing peace plan discussions. 201
Bosnia required a halt to ethnic cleansing, arrangement for U.N. supervi-
sion of all heavy weapons, enforcement of the "No-Fly" Zone over Bosnia,
and safe passage for relief convoys. 202
Far from resolving the situation, the Vance-Owen peace plan exacer-
bated tensions in the region.20 3 Reports of renewed ethnic cleansing by
Serb gunmen surfaced after the announcement of the plan's details. 20 4
Witnesses claimed that Serb forces drove 5,000 Muslims from the Bosnian
town of Tuzla, and another 4,000 from the town of Trebinje.205 The Serb
aggression seemed to be aimed at gaining control of the road linking the
Bosnian town of Zvornik with Serbian-held areas around Sarajevo. 206 The
fact that under the Vance-Owen peace plan Muslims would control these
regions led the Bosnian government to accuse Serbs of attempting to frus-
194. Paul Lewis, Bosnia Mediators Urging U.S. to Join Peace Force N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5,
1993, at AS.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Paul Lewis, Bosnia Peace Talks Yield No Progress, N.Y. TrMEs, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al0.
199. Id.
200. Chuck Sudetic, Bosnia Peace Plan Said to Spur New Attacks by Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 1993, at A10. David Owen contends, however, that the plan does not reward Serbian
aggression, because: "The rural Bosnian Serbs sat on over 60 percent of the country
before the war, and we are offering them three provinces covering 43 percent." The
Future of the Balkans; An Interview with David Owen, 72 FoRaG Arr. 1 (Spring 1993).
201. Lewis, supra note 198.
202. Id.
203. Sudetic, supra note 200; Lewis, supra note 198.
204. Sudetic, supra note 200.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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trate the peace talks by consolidating their power in the region.2°7
In February 1993, the incoming Clinton administration further
stymied the peace negotiations by announcing that it would not support
the Vance-Owen peace plan.208 Bosnia's Muslims responded to the
announcement by halting any further discussion of the Vance-Owen plan,
hoping that the Clinton administration would propose a plan that would
prove more favorable to the Muslim population.20 9 Responding to pres-
sures from other U.N. members, the Clinton administration quickly
reversed its position on the Vance-Owen peace plan210 and declared that
it would intervene to hasten a peaceful resolution to the crisis.21 ' The
administration also announced its support for heavier sanctions against
Serbia and the creation of an international war crimes court 212
By early March, in response to both frustrations with all parties to the
negotiations and the extent of suffering by Bosnia's civilian population,
the Clinton administration undertook an extensive effort to air-drop relief
supplies to isolated regions in Bosnia.213 While the administration
claimed that it intended to benefit suffering members of all parties, 214 it
clearly aimed its efforts at reaching Bosnia's Muslim population which Ser-
bian forces had isolated.215 Administration officials claimed that the
effort proved successful in improving the plight of starving civilians.216
Critics, however, argued that not only did the air-drops prove inaccurate,
and thus ineffective in reaching isolated regions,2 "7 but the aid drew Bos-
nia's Muslim troops away from their positions and enabled Serb rebels to
increase their offensive efforts and take positions not previously held.218
Reports indicated that the towns of Tuzla219 and Cerska220 fell as a result
207. Id.
208. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Declines to Back Peace Plan as the Balkan Talks Shift to U.N.,
N.Y. TraEs, Feb. 2, 1993, at AS; Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Faces a Delicate Task in Intervening in
Negotiations on Bosnia, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1993, at A10 [hereinafter U.S. Faces Delicate
Task].
209. John F. Burns, Bigger U.S. Peace Role Leaves Bosnians Split, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1993, at A10.
210. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Backs Bosnian Peace Plan; Serbs May Keep Occupied Land, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al.
211. U.S. Faces Delicate Task; supra note 208.
212. Id.
213. Stephen Kinzer, U.S. Planes Begin Effort to Airdrop Aid to Bosnia, N.Y. Tmins, Mar.
1, 1993, at Al. Although United Nations forces had been present in the region attempt-
ing to deliver humanitarian aid, they limited these attempts to ground convoys which
relied upon the permission of Serb rebels to travel to areas in need of relief supplies.
Id.
214. Stephen Kinzer, Much Bosnian Aid Missed its Targe N.Y. Trm.s, Mar. 2, 1993, at
Al, A9.
215. Thomas L. Friedman, Airdrop Proposal Gets Endorsement of the U.N. Chief, N.Y.
TimFs, Feb. 24, 1993, at Al.
216. Kinzer, supra note 214, at A9.
217. Id See also Friedman, supra note 215, at A8; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Aircraft
Will Drop Cargo at High Altitude, N.Y. TrmEs, Feb. 24, 1993, at A8.
218. Chuck Sudetic, Bosnian Muslims Feeing Villages Under Sheilfire N.Y. TuMEs, Mar. 4,
1993, at Al.
219. Id.
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of diminished defenses brought about by the inaccurate administration of
aid. In addition, critics contended that the air-drops put French and Brit-
ish troops on the ground in Bosnia at risk of Serbian retaliation.2 2 1
By earlyJuly 1993, the parties had moved in such disparate directions
that many observers considered the Vance-Owen peace plan "dead."222
Negotiations continued through the summer, with both the adverse par-
ties and the international mediators leaning upon Bosnia's Muslim popu-
lation in an effort to bring peace to the region.223 Whether these efforts
will bring a halt to the fighting remains unclear. The U.N., however, has
not yet taken meaningful action to prevent the spread of ethnic cleansing.
B. Political Shortcomings
The U.N.'s failure to take steps to prevent ethnic cleansing rests not on
any structural flaws in the international legal system, but upon political
disputes. Whether viewed as an international or domestic conflict, the
current body of international law offers an adequate means to address the
egregious human rights violations occurring daily in Bosnia. What the
current structure cannot address, however, is the difference in political
will.
From the outset, the U.N. and most outside observers have viewed the
conflict in the Balkans as a "threat to international peace and security."224
Upon these grounds, the Security Council first acted to impose an arms
embargo225 and strict economic sanctions upon the region.2 26 The Gen-
eral Assembly has also characterized the dispute as one of "international"
character, with the interests of sovereign nations at stake.2 27 Enforcement
of the U.N. Charter would insulate the newly-formed governments from
foreign intervention, thereby effectively protecting each regions' ability to
establish their own political structure. This would render Serbia's
attempts to supply Serbian rebels within Bosnia and Croatia clear viola-
tions of the U.N. Charter,228 which obliges members to show "respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 229
220. John F. Burns, Enclave in Bosnia Reported to Fall After U.S. Airdrop, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1993, at Al.
221. John F. Bums, U.N. Officials Warn on Bosnia Airdrop, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at
A8.
222. Daniel Williams, Three-Way Partition of Bosnia; Realities of War Come to Fore; Vance-
Owen Plan of Multiethnic Makeup Seems to Evaporate, WASH. Post, June 19, 1993, at A12;
Kim Murphy, Vance-Owen Plan Victim of Talks on Bosnia, LA TiMEsJune 18, 1993, at Al.
223. Peter Maass, Bosnia Rejects Pressure for Partitioning; Opponents, Mediators Lean on
Muslim Leader, WAsH. Post, Sept. 1, 1993, at A25; Paul Lewis, Bosnian Leader Resists Pres-
sure to Negotiate on Partition Plan, N.Y. TPMEs, June 26, 1993, at A5.
224. See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 160, at 3. See also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg., Doc. No. S/RES/827 (1993); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3199th mtg., Doc. No. S/RES/819 (1993); S.C. Res. 808, supra note 185; GA Res. 242,
supra note 181, at 6.
225. S.C. Res. 713, supra note 160, at 3.
226. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 177, at 13.
227. GA Res. 242, supra note 181, at 6.
228. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
229. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 2.
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The U.N. could combat human rights violations subjecting the Balkan
states to the traditional policies exercised by the General Assembly and the
Security Council. Both of these bodies have consistently held that,
because of the human rights obligations of member nations under Article
1(3) and Article 55 of the Charter, any human rights violation after mem-
bership no longer constitutes a "domestic" issue, but instead takes on an
international character.2 3 0 Therefore, any remedial action taken by U.N.
authorities cannot violate the Article 2(7) prohibition on intervention.2 1
Should the U.N. muster the political willpower,2 32 ample legal foundation
clearly exists to warrant sending U.N. troops to the region to remove both
Croatian and Serbian troops from their strongholds in Bosnia.2 3
The conflict within Bosnia, between the Muslim population and the
Bosnian Serbs, requires a slightly different analysis. Bosnian Serbs have
proclaimed their right of self-determination within the nation of Bos-
nia.23 4 As a means to achieve this end, and aided to a great extent by
Serbia itself,235 the Bosnian Serbs have undertaken an armed uprising
230. Delbrfick, supra note 8, at 893.
231. Id.
232. While the U.N. has established an arms embargo in the region, it must coordi-
nate steps to insure enforcement. See supra notes 160-164, and accompanying text.
Recent reports indicate that intelligence forces have detected Serbian attempts to vio-
late not only the embargo imposed upon the Balkan region, but also the arms embargo
imposed upon Somalia. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Believes Greek Ship Is Carrying Serbian
Arms to Somalia, N.Y. TrMEs, Feb. 23, 1993, at A6 [hereinafter Greek Ship Carrying Serbian
Arms]. See also Michael R. Gordon, In Test of Serbian Embargo, U.S. Presses to Sieze a Ship,
N.Y. Tims, Feb. 26, 1993, at A8. Reports accuse Serbs of orchestrating a complex
scheme to sell Serbian weapons-a large stockpile of which was inherited from the
Yugoslav National Army-in exchange for cash to illegally purchase goods badly
needed in Serbia. Greek Ship Carrying Serbian Arms, supra. See also Craig R. Whitney, U.N.
Boycott Has Belgrade Angry at U.S., N.Y. TuMEs, Mar. 4, 1993, at A4. A detailed report by
American officials alleges that Serbs shipped arms, on a ship sailing under a Greek flag,
to Kenya where the Kenyans would smuggle the arms across the border into Somalia.
Greek Ship Canying Serbian Arms, supra. However, after apparently learning of the fate
that awaited them in Kenya, the ship changed to a Honduran flag and set course for
Singapore. Id.
The United States leads the effort to capture ships accused of illegally delivering
goods to the former Yugoslavia by urging allies to detain suspected vessels. Id. How-
ever, despite U.S. efforts to put "teeth" in the embargo, coordination has not been
forthcoming. Id. Italian warships seized the Dimitrakis, after its alleged January 19,
1993 violation in the Montenagrin port of Bar, afler it left port. Id. However, when a
local Italian magistrate decided that the Dimitrakis' papers met with his satisfaction, he
released the ship. Id. Washington has requested that other nations seize the ship wher-
ever it comes to port, seeking to bring the matter before the U.N. Sanctions Committee,
but whether or not such efforts will prove fruitful remains unclear. Id.
Such slipshod efforts clearly prove inadequate. After-the-fact enforcement of a block-
ade seems woefully insufficient to deter smugglers who seem willing to risk the slight
chance of detection in return for the large profits gained from contraband sales. To
isolate the region, the U.N. must establish an enforcement mechanism that will halt
violations before they occur and quickly punish those caught violating U.N. mandates.
233. The characterization of the dispute as a "threat to international peace and
security" opens the door to enforcement procedures under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, including the use of force. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
234. Weller, supra note 71, at 597.
235. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
Cornell International Law Journal
against their elected government. 2 6 An integral part of this campaign is
the practice of ethnic cleansing.2 7 Although this internal conflict must
be viewed as a kind of civil war,2 8 the United Nations has characterized
ethnic cleansing as a threat to international peace and security.28 9
Clearly, any steps to remedy this would be grounded in international
law.24° The prohibition against requiring member states to subject
"domestic" issues to resolution by the U.N. is subject to enforcement meas-
ures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.241
IV. New Solutions
A. A "Humanitarian" Interpretation of the U.N. Charter
The modem international community must forge new legal doctrines to
remedy the unique problems it faces.242 Never before have so many peo-
ples sought to embrace the "fundamental" rights of self-determination and
democracy.248 As our modem conceptions of "justice" evolve, so too must
our interpretations of those documents that govern international
relations.
One would be hard pressed to find a modem advocate of "sover-
eignty" who would claim that the doctrine applies-in terms of interna-
tional relations-to the "establishment" of an unjust political leader.244
Such a principle lies at the foundation of the international right of self-
defense-a leader cannot acquire legitimate control of another state
merely by seizing it 24 So too should our concepts of "sovereignty" in the
domestic arena evolve to stand for "popular sovereignty." 246 Such an
interpretation would not prevent intervention under the U.N. Charter to
redress human rights violations when the polity's ability to determine their
own form of governance is not threatened.247 Widespread and persistent
236. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
237. See Further Report by Secretay-General supra note 128, 1 5.
238. For a comprehensive analysis of the Yugoslavian Civil War and its international
ramifications, see Charles Lewis Nier HIl, The Yugoslavian Civil War. An Analysis of the
Applicability of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Modern
World, 10 Dxcx. J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
239. S.C. Res. 819, supra note 224; S.C. Res. 827, supra note 224.
240. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. Balancing World Needs vs. Separate State, SAC.
RAmwro BEE, Aug. 28, 1993 (describing the importance of multilateralism to preserve
the "international state system" and defend "legitimate" minority rights in the post-cold-
war era).
243. Id.
244. See supra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
245. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
246. Many critics urge that accepted theories of governance have already evolved to
this state. See, e.g., Boutros-Ghali, supra note 242; Thomas M. Franck, TheEmerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
247. Scholars have argued that the present narrow view of humanitarian interven-
tion-breaching a state's territorial integrity for the limited purpose of rescuing one's
nationals-does not constitute the only possible alternative under current international
law. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 33, at 310; Delbrfick, supra note 7, at 891-94. See gener-
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human rights violations within a society indicate a breakdown in the polit-
ical structure and an internal social crisis. Hence, humanitarian interven-
tion should not be viewed as an affront to sovereignty, but as a necessary
tool to preserve it.
In addition, the prohibitions against intervention in "domestic" affairs
must also be reinterpreted to conform to modem notions of "human
rights."248 As with the doctrine of "sovereignty," international law must
evolve to view all peoples, both collectively and individually, as possessing
fundamental human rights which are not subject to the sole jurisdiction of
the individual state.2 49 For states that are members of the U.N., authority
for viewing human rights issues as domestic issues can be found in the
U.N. Charter and other international documents that bind the interna-
tional community. For states that have not been admitted to the U.N.,
justification for protecting these rights arises from that pre-Charter body
of international law that is resurrected by our reinterpretation of the Char-
ter's mandates.250
The U.N. Charter is replete with references and commitments to pro-
tecting "fundamental human rights."251 While conceding this point, many
critics contend that Article 2(7) forbids U.N. intervention in domestic
matters that do not pose a threat to "international peace and security"
under Chapter VII, and that human rights violations fall within the aegis
ally Michael Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the
Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN.J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Captain Thomas E.
Behuniak, The Law of the Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal
Survey, 79 MR. L. REv. 157 (1978); Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw AND
ThE CIVIL WAR IN nrM MoDEM Woatm 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Felix
Ermacora, Commentary on Article 2(7) no. 10 and no. 12, in DIE C-ARTA DER VERENEN
NATiONEN-KoMmNTAR 106-10 (B. Simma ed., 1991); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in
Lao's Empire: TheJurisprudence of War, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); H. Scott Farley, State
Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: ReopeningPandora's Box, 10 GA.J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 29 (1980); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALI.
W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974); HUMANuAmN INTERVEN ON AND =hE UNrrE_ NATIONS (Rich-
ard B. Lillich ed., 1973);James A.R. Nafzinger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Inter-
vention in a Community of Power, 20 DEcv. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 9 (1991); Ved P. Nanda,
Humanitarian Military Intervention, WoLD ViEw, Oct. 1978, at 23; Kevin Ryan, Rights,
Intervention and Self-Determination, 20 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55 (1991); Eisuke Suzuki,
A State's Provisional Competence to Protect Human Rights in a Foreign State, 15 TEXAS INT'L
L.J. 231 (1980); MIcHAXI WALZ=, Jusr AND Urjusr WARs 107-08 (1977). By viewing
"sovereignty" as "popular sovereignty," foreign states would be justified in intervening
to protect a foreign populace when its "sovereignty" is being violated. See supra note 64.
248. It seems axiomatic that any construction of "fundamental human rights" must
include the protection against systematic extermination. While significant debate exists
as to the breadth of "fundamental human rights," such debate seems irrelevant for pur-
poses of this discussion. Few would argue that genocide and "ethnic cleansing" fall
within a questionable penumbra of"fundamental human rights." Indeed for the term
to have any significance, protection against genocide and similar evils must lie at its
core.
249. Arguably, international law prior to the U.N. Charter recognized that individu-
als possessed rights which individual states could not violate. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
250. See supra section I.C.1.
251. See generally U.N. ChARms_ pmbl; arts. 1; 2; 13(1)(b); 55(c); 56; 62(2); 76(c).
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of domestic jurisdiction. Nothing in the Charter classifies "human rights"
as a domestic issue. A careful reading of the Charter reveals a document
that may be interpreted to consider egregious human rights violations as
beyond the "domestic" jurisdiction of a state.
The preamble to the Charter recites its commitment to "the dignity
and worth of the human person" and the promotion of "social progress
and better standards of life."2 52 Article I moves a step further and declares
the U.N.'s dedication to "achiev[ing] international cooperation in solving
international problems of [a] ... humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights."253 Such a reference appears to
contemplate human rights violations that fall beyond the realm of domes-
tic jurisdiction and under the purview of international bodies. While the
Charter does not specify what these "international human rights" viola-
tions might be, logic suggests that internalized conflicts must fall into this
category. Without such an interpretation, the independent goal has no
substantive meaning because international conflicts are covered
elsewhere.
Careful reading of Article 2 of the Charter further supports this analy-
sis. The power granted to the Security Council under Chapter VII must
extend beyond conventional conceptions of "international peace and
security."254 Unless one envisions international threats to peace that do
not constitute international acts of aggression, the exception to the princi-
ple of nonintervention, as stated in Article 2(7),255 has no substantive
meaning.256 Defining threats to "international peace and security" exclu-
sively in terms of international acts of aggression would not require an
exception under Article 2(7), because by definition the Act would not fall
within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the acting state.25 7
Additionally, to protect human rights adequately, the U.N. must take
new steps to define the scope of necessity and proportionality in humani-
tarian intervention. Interpreting the principles of nonintervention and
self-determination in a manner consistent with upholding fundamental
human rights would serve as a starting point.258 As Professor Fernando
252. U.N. CHAER pmbl.
253. Id. art. 1, 1 3 (emphasis added).
254. Delbrfick, supra note 7, at 897.
255. See supra note 54.
256. Delbriick, supra note 7, at 897.
257. Id. Many resolute critics argue that even if human rights violations constitute an
international concern, Article 24 only gives the Security Council power to maintain
"international peace and security," U.N. CHaar art. 24,1 1, and as long as the dispute
remains internalized, the Security Council cannot intervene. Such a reading of the
powers granted to the Security Council fils to recognize the guidelines that Article 24
provides to determine the appropriate course of action: "In discharging these duties
the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations." Id. Because the Security Council must determine what constitutes a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," i. art. 39, in reaching
such a conclusion it must necessarily consider whether a situation constitutes an "inter-
nationalproblem of... [a] humanitarian character," id. art. 1, 13 (emphasis added), or
threatens "universal respect for... human rights" IM art. 55, 1 c (emphasis added).
258. TEs6N, supra note 42, at 200.
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Tes6n argues, determining the extent of legal humanitarian intervention
involves the balancing of the various competing principles (i.e., funda-
mental human rights, nonintervention, and self-determination) rather
than choosing one alternative without consideration of the others.2 59 Pro-
fessor Ved Nanda suggests some criterion that might simplify this
evaluation:
(1) ... the proper interpretation of Article 2(4) [of the U.N. Charter] would
be to proscribe the use of force when it is directed at sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of a state... ; (2) ... humanitarian
intervention, by definition, does not seek to challenge these attributes... ;
[and] (3) ... the promotion and protection of human rights... constitut[e]
an important obligation under the United Nations Charter.2 6°
By establishing these limitations on the use of humanitarian intervention,
the international community can protect the goal of preserving funda-
mental human rights while preserving the integrity of the principles of
nonintervention and self-determination.
Above all else, our modem notions of international law must be
informed by our notions of political "sovereignty" and "domestic" affairs.
Obligations and restrictions under the U.N. Charter and other legal
instruments must be interpreted paii matefia with the proposed duties and
principles contained therein. The international community's interest in
protecting such doctrines is too important to be bound by outdated doc-
trines of "plain language."26 1
259. Id.
260. Nanda, supra note 33, at 310 (footnote omitted).
261. Some have argued that the establishment of a private cause of action for the
victims serves as the best way to provide a meaningful remedy for human rights. See,
e.g., Frank C. Newman, Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human Rights, 20 DrEV. J. INT'L
L. & PoL'Y 213, 216 (1992) (arguing that "[miost people whose international human
rights have been violated will be aided more by non-criminal than by criminal sanc-
tions."). In this vein, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the International League for
Human Rights and the International Women's Human Rights Clinic of the City Univer-
sity of NewYork's Law School have filed a class-action lawsuit against Radovan Karadzic,
the Bosnian Serb leader, on behalf of the numerous women and men "who suffered
rape, summary execution, other torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment inflicted by Bosnian Serb forces under the command and control of the defend-
ant [Karadzic]." Niel A. Lewis, New Talks on Bosnia Set to Begin Monday at U.N., N.Y.
TamEs, Feb. 27, 1993, at 5. The action was brought under the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. § 1350). Id. The Torture Victim Protection Act allows plaintiffs
to bring civil claims against a foreigner for acts committed outside the United States if
the foreigner is within the jurisdiction of an American court. See genera/ly 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350. Although this measure seems unlikely to secure any relief for the victims, pri-
marily because the courts cannot force the appearance of the defendant and because
he has no siezable assets in the country, it presents a strong statement by both the
plaintiffs and the U.S. courts that these alleged human rights violations merit serious
attention. Lewis, supra, at 5.
Some critics have argued that permitting such claims hinders the ability of U.N.
negotiators to reach a peaceful resolution. Id. See also Lewis, supra. However, granting
immunity to an alleged criminal would be more than a symbolic betrayal of human
rights principles, and the United States has taken the proper course by permitting the
suit and denying Dr. Karadzic's request for immunity.
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B. Unilateral Third Party Intervention
As the international community embraces visions of "sovereignty" that
emphasize the concept of popular sovereignty and public choice, the
traditional reasons for prohibiting third party unilateral intervention van-
ish. A traditional reason for preventing unilateral intervention was that it
would be widely abused; nations would intervene for territorial rather than
humanitarian reasons. 262 The modern system of global communication
facilitates confirmation of such goals obviating the need for such a prohi-
bition.2 63 Furthermore, should such an abuse occur, the international
community has quite convincingly demonstrated its ability to remedy such
violations.2 64
Additionally, as the concept of "popular sovereignty" spreads and
becomes the international norm, the ability to act unilaterally will help
remove the political impediments that have prevented effective assistance
of the crisis in Bosnia.26 5 Questions of the proper scope and means to
address egregious human rights violations will devolve into political ques-
tions. Those states whose populace feels that the costs of aiding innocent
human rights victims do not outweigh the benefits will be free to make
that choice.266 The extensive administrative bodies of the United Nations
can serve as a means to coordinate aid efforts. Additionally, the interna-
tional community, through the U.N., can adopt procedures to prevent
needless confusion and wasting of effort. Above all else, the international
community should seek to end the ban in unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention, because when the international community founds its institutions
262. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
263. The use of such modem technology as "spy" satellites and other global telecom-
munications media can confirm or refute specific allegations of many events occurring
on the other side of the world. See; e.g., Steven V. Roberts et al., New Diplomay by Fax
Americana, U.S. NEws & Womi.D REP., June 19, 1989, at 32.
264. One recent example is the Persian Gulf War, which, due to its unprecedented
display of international cooperation, has sparked a controversy concerning the "legal-
ity" of such multilateral efforts. SeeJohn Quigley, The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Dsorder?, 25 CORNzu. INT'L LJ. 1 (1992).
265. See supra section III.B.
266. As reports of ethnic cleansing have -multiplied, and evidence of atrocities has
grown, many members of the international community have expressed their frustration
over the U.N.'s apparent lack of concern for Bosnia's Muslim population. Recent
reports reveal sources of outside intervention. Public outrage in much of Europe, espe-
cially France, reflects the public opinion that authorities must take steps to prevent
further "ethnic cleansing." A recent poll in France revealed that 68% of French voters
openly advocate military intervention. William Drozdiak, France Weighs Direct Bosnia
Intervention, Hous. Crioi., Dec. 27, 1992, at A24. A recent bipartisan appeal by French
Socialists and opposition Conservatives to President Francois Mitterand indicates the
impact of this outcry upon public officials. The bipartisan appeal urged Mitterand to
issue an ultimatum to Serb leaders to halt ethnic cleansing and give up their seige of
Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. Id. The proposed ultimatum would carry the threat
of direct military intervention if Serbs do not abide by it. Id. A recent statement by
French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas-stating that the U.N. must quickly act "to take
all necessary steps to liberate the detention camps"-indicates France's resolute posi-
tion on the issue. Id.
See also Six Islamic Nations Offer Bosnia Force, Cm. Tam., July 14, 1993, at 10.
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on the notion of "popular sovereignty," such a ban only impedes the pro-
tection of human rights.
Conclusion
In order to protect minorities from systematic extermination, the interna-
tional community must establish the legal foundation for allowing nations
with the political will to intervene militarily in disputes that do not meet
the conventional definition of "international aggression." As the desire
for self-determination spreads across the globe, international law can pro-
tect this valid interest by permitting humanitarian intervention only when
necessary to protect human rights. As the situation in Bosnia demon-
strates, failure to interpret international instruments according to our
modem understanding of "sovereignty" and "self-determination" reduces
internal conflicts threatening fundamental human rights to political
debates within the U.N. International law should encourage, rather than
limit, the international protection of human rights by establishing mecha-
nisms that lead to action rather than rhetoric.

